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THE KILLER ROBOTS ARE HERE: LEGAL AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
Rebecca Crootof† 
  In little over a year, the possibility of a complete ban on autonomous 
weapon systems—known colloquially as “killer robots”—has evolved from a 
proposal in an NGO report to the subject of an international meeting with 
representatives from over eighty states. However, no one has yet put 
forward a coherent definition of autonomy in weapon systems from a law of 
armed conflict perspective, which often results in the conflation of legal, 
ethical, policy, and political arguments. This Article therefore proposes that 
an “autonomous weapon system” be defined as “a weapon system that, 
based on conclusions derived from gathered information and 
preprogrammed constraints, is capable of independently selecting and 
engaging targets.” 
  Applying this definition, and contrary to the nearly universal consensus, 
it quickly becomes apparent that autonomous weapon systems are not 
weapons of the future: they exist and have already been integrated into 
states’ armed forces. The fact that such weaponry is currently being used 
with little critique has a number of profound implications. First, it 
undermines pro-ban arguments based on the premise that autonomous 
weapon systems are inherently unlawful. Second, it significantly reduces the 
likelihood that a complete ban would be successful, as states will be 
unwilling to voluntarily relinquish otherwise lawful and uniquely effective 
weaponry. 
  But law is not doomed to follow technology: if used proactively, law can 
channel the development and use of autonomous weapon systems. This 
Article concludes that intentional international regulation is needed, now, 
and suggests how such regulation may be designed to incorporate beneficial 
legal limitations and humanitarian protections. 
 
 †  Ph.D. Candidate in Law, Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; Resident Fellow, Yale 
Information Society Project. Thanks to Douglas Bernstein, Eyal Benvenisti, Bonnie Docherty, 
Stuart Ford, Harold Hongju Koh, and Paul Scharre for their thoughtful edits and contributions; to 
Jack Balkin, Lea Brilmayer, Oona Hathaway, Zachary Herz, Margot Kaminski, Ryan Liss, Robert 
Post, Reva Siegel, Julia Spiegel, and my fellow Ph.D.s in Law for their insights and encouragement; 
and to Mark Crootof for my lifelong love of science fiction. This Article also benefited greatly 
from participants’ comments at ASIL’s 2014 Midyear Meeting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Autonomous weapon systems have long been a bugaboo of science 
fiction. Hal 9000 of 2001: A Space Odyssey, the Cylons of Battlestar 
Galatica, the spider robots of Kabu-Kabu, and the Terminator’s 
namesake all are imagined self-directed lethal robots, terrifying in large 
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part because they do not experience empathy, pity, and mercy—and 
because they might escape all human control.1 
But, contrary to the general consensus,2 autonomous weapon 
systems are far from fictional. Weapon systems with varying levels of 
autonomy and lethality have already been integrated into the armed 
forces of numerous states. Israel, Russia, and South Korea reportedly 
have autonomous weapon systems currently patrolling their borders 
and bases; Israel and the United Kingdom have fire-and-forget missiles 
which independently select and engage targets; China and Russia 
employ sea mines which determine when and against what to deploy 
torpedoes; and the United States is developing and using a host of 
autonomous ground, air, and sea-based weapon systems. 
Spurred by dystopic visions of indiscriminate robotic warfare, in 
December 2012, Human Rights Watch and the Harvard International 
Human Rights Clinic issued a report calling for a complete ban on fully 
autonomous weapon systems.3 While not the first such plea, this highly 
publicized report sparked a heated debate on whether such weapons 
should (or could) be banned.4 In April 2013, the conglomerate 
nongovernmental organization Campaign to Stop Killer Robots formed 
for the sole purpose of promoting a ban. One month later, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights presented a 
 
 1 To be fair, there are also benign, even invaluable, autonomous weapon systems populating 
science fiction as well, including Lieutenant Commander Data, R2D2, and the reprogrammed 
Terminator of Terminator 2: Judgment Day. 
 2 Both proponents and skeptics of a ban tend to agree that, while states may begin integrating 
autonomous weapon systems into their armed forces within the next few decades, such weapons 
do not yet exist. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD 
LAW SCH., LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 46 (2012) [hereinafter LOSING 
HUMANITY], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_
0.pdf (“Although fully autonomous weapons do not exist yet, technology is rapidly moving in that 
direction.”); Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon 
Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 231, 234 (2013) (“[A]n 
outright ban is premature since no such weapons have even left the drawing board.”). 
 3 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2. 
 4 Many join Human Rights Watch and the Harvard International Human Rights Clinic in 
advocating for a complete ban. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Banning Autonomous Killing: The 
Legal and Ethical Requirement that Humans Make Near-Time Lethal Decisions, in THE AMERICAN 
WAY OF BOMBING: CHANGING ETHICAL AND LEGAL NORMS, FROM FLYING FORTRESSES TO 
DRONES 224 (Matthew Evangelista & Henry Shue eds., 2014); Peter Asaro, On Banning 
Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal 
Decision-Making, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 687 (2012); Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability of 
Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 787 (2012). 
  There are a number of vocal skeptics of such a ban. See, e.g., Shane R. Reeves & William J. 
Johnson, Autonomous Weapons: Are You Sure These Are Killer Robots? Can We Talk About It?, 
2014 ARMY LAW. 25, 31 (2014); Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 2, at 234; Kenneth Anderson & 
Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work 
and How the Laws of War Can, HOOVER INST. (Apr. 9, 2013), http://media.hoover.org/sites/
default/files/documents/Anderson-Waxman_LawAndEthics_r2_FINAL.pdf. 
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report to the Human Rights Council questioning whether the 
deployment of autonomous weapon systems was permissible.5 Many 
state delegates suggested that the topic be addressed at the upcoming 
meeting of state parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons—and, in November, the state parties to the Convention 
agreed. Consequently, in May 2014, representatives from over eighty 
states and from United Nations agencies, civil society, and other 
international and transnational organizations attended a “Meeting of 
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” to discuss the 
possibility of a complete ban on such weaponry.6 
Ban proponents have good reason to be enthused: this may well be 
one of the swiftest campaigns in history to ban a class of weaponry.7 But 
in the excitement of the progressing debate, neither side has managed to 
construct a coherent definition for autonomous weapon systems for the 
purpose of a weapons ban. Instead, “autonomy” in weapon systems 
often means different things to different stakeholders, and as a result, 
state representatives, developers, military lawyers, human rights 
activists, philosophers, and other policymakers often talk past each 
other.8 Indeed, during the recent international Experts Meeting on 
Autonomous Weapon Systems, multiple states noted the need for 
clarification.9 Thus, not only is a definition of autonomy for weapon 
systems from a law of armed conflict perspective necessary to fill a gap 
in the legal literature, it is crucial to current and ongoing treaty 
discussions. 
 
 5 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 20–21, Human Rights 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Heyns Report] (written by Christof 
Heyns and calling for national moratoria on the testing, production, assembly, transfer, 
acquisition, deployment, and use of lethal autonomous weapons). 
 6 Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel, Report of the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN OFF. GENEVA (May 16, 2014), http://www.unog.ch/
80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/350D9ABED1AFA515C1257CF30047A8C7/$file/
Report_AdvancedVersion_10June.pdf [hereinafter Chairperson Simon-Michel Report]. A follow-
up meeting was held in April 2015. 
 7 See Sarah Knuckey, Start of First Inter-Governmental Expert Meeting on Autonomous 
Weapons, JUST SECURITY (May 13, 2014, 3:17 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2014/05/13/start-inter-
governmental-expert-meeting-autonomous-weapons (quoting the Netherlands representative as 
saying “‘never before has a disarmament issue gained interest so quickly’”). 
 8 See, e.g., ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS 
WEAPONS 43 (2009) (describing political, philosophical, and technical definitions of “autonomy” 
and observing that, “[a]s the discourse on autonomous robots gets seized more and more by 
philosophers . . . the confusion about ‘autonomous weapons’ in the public debate increases”); 
Kathleen Lawand, Fully Autonomous Weapon Systems, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Nov. 25, 
2013), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/09-03-autonomous-
weapons.htm (noting that, although there is “a wealth [of] expert literature on this subject, there 
is somewhat of a lack of consistency in the use of terms”). 
 9 See Knuckey, supra note 7. 
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Part I begins with a review of existing definitions and their flaws. It 
then proposes a new definition for autonomy in weapon systems, which 
turns on the central issue in legal debates regarding a weapon ban—
whether a human being must take an affirmative action before lethal 
force is used against a specific target. Accordingly, an “autonomous 
weapon system” is “a weapon system that, based on conclusions derived 
from gathered information and preprogrammed constraints, is capable 
of independently selecting and engaging targets.” With this clarified 
definition it quickly becomes apparent that autonomous weapon 
systems are not weapons of the future: they exist and are in use today. 
This is not to say there is not ample space along the autonomy spectrum 
from weaponry currently in use to the Terminator—but that space is far 
less significant than the distinction between a weapon that cannot use 
lethal force against a specific target without a human operator’s 
affirmative action and one that can. 
The fact that autonomous weapon systems are already in use has 
two profound implications. First, as discussed in Part II, it undermines 
arguments that autonomous weapon systems are inherently illegal. Ban 
advocates make a number of important moral, policy, and strategic 
arguments, but their primary legal claim is that autonomous weapon 
systems will never be able to comply with the law of armed conflict. 
Specifically, they argue that autonomous weapon systems will not be 
able to distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets; that they will 
not be able to conduct in bello proportionality assessments, which entail 
determining whether the military objective to be gained is worth the risk 
of likely collateral damage; and that their use may not accord with the 
Martens Clause of the First Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions—which, ban proponents argue, requires new technology 
to comply with “the principles of humanity” and “the dictates of the 
public conscience.” Some question whether states will be able to hold 
individuals accountable for war crimes committed by autonomous 
weapon systems; still others posit that the decision to kill another 
human being can never be lawfully delegated to a machine. Ban skeptics, 
responding to these arguments, dispute the associated analyses—but 
they accept the proponents’ assumption that autonomous weapon 
systems are futuristic weaponry. However, insofar as such weaponry is 
currently being used with little to no critique, legal arguments for a ban 
lose their force. Autonomous weapon systems now in use are being 
lawfully employed—thus, such weapons as a class are not inherently 
unlawful. 
Should autonomous weapon systems nonetheless be banned? Some 
ban proponents are willing to concede that these weapons are not per se 
unlawful, but argue that they should nonetheless be banned for a host of 
other reasons. However, the fact that autonomous weapon systems are 
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already in use significantly reduces the likelihood that states will enact 
an effective ban. Scholars on both sides of the ban debate have mined 
history for evidence that states will or will not be able to successfully ban 
autonomous weapon systems, but by and large they provide little 
analysis of which of these precedents are most apt. Part III therefore 
discusses eight qualities which seem to increase the likelihood that a 
given ban will be successful: the weapon causes superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering; the weapon is inherently indiscriminate; the 
weapon is ineffective; other means exist for accomplishing a similar 
military objective; the ban is clear and narrowly tailored; there has been 
related prior regulation; there is significant public concern and civil 
society engagement; and there is sufficient state commitment. Of these, 
only one characteristic—civil society engagement—suggests that a ban 
on autonomous weapon systems would be successful; the others are 
either inconclusive or currently weigh against the likelihood of a 
successful ban. 
“Killer robots” are here, and they are here to stay. But law is not 
doomed to follow technology: if used proactively, law can channel the 
development and use of autonomous weapon systems. Part IV therefore 
considers the question of how such weaponry might be effectively 
regulated. After discussing the need for intentional international 
lawmaking, now, this Part concludes with concrete suggestions as to 
how it might be designed to incorporate many of the beneficial legal 
limitations and humanitarian protections associated with a complete 
ban. 
I.     WHAT’S IN A NAME? 
Autonomous Weapon Systems. Killer Robots. Unmanned Lethal 
Weapons. Lethal Autonomous Robots. Many writers on this subject use 
the terms “autonomous,” “robots,” “lethal,” and “weapon systems” in 
various combinations, often presuming that the reader will intuitively 
grasp the distinction between hypothetical, futuristic weaponry and 
existing, lawful weapon systems. 
But as there is no coherent definition of “autonomy” in weapon 
systems, that distinction is far from clear. Why, for example, do some 
consider a weapon system that independently identifies, tracks, and 
engages an incoming threat merely “automated” or “automatic,” but rail 
against prospective “autonomous” weapon systems that would 
independently identify, track, and engage a target? Until there is a 
shared legal definition of autonomy for weapon systems, it will be 
impossible to have a productive conversation about what a new treaty 
should ban or regulate. 
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After reviewing existing definitions and their flaws, this Part 
proposes a new definition for autonomy in weapon systems. It should be 
acknowledged at the outset that this definition, like any definition in 
law, is not an independent, abstract formulation. Instead, its 
construction is necessarily tied to the purpose it is designed to serve—
clarifying what should constitute an autonomous weapon system from a 
law of armed conflict perspective. As a result, this definition turns on 
whether human involvement is necessary for a weapon system to 
exercise lethal force against a specific target. Different legal regimes or 
different disciplines might require definitions that emphasize other 
attributes of autonomous weapon systems. 
This new definition allows for a relatively clear categorization of 
existing weapon systems into inert, automated, semi-autonomous, and 
autonomous weapon systems.10 Once these categories are delineated, a 
surprising fact quickly becomes clear: contrary to the nearly universal 
consensus, autonomous weapon systems currently exist and have 
already been integrated into states’ armed forces. As discussed in greater 
detail in the remainder of this Article, this fact has profound 
implications for the discussion over how such weapons should be 
regulated. 
A.     The Need for a Law of Armed Conflict-Based Definition 
“Autonomy” carries vastly different meanings in different fields. A 
political scientist might define autonomy as the ability to be self-
governing; a philosopher might focus on an entity’s moral 
independence; an engineer might be concerned with a machine’s level of 
dependence on human beings in completing different tasks. Due in part 
to these differing understandings of autonomy, various stakeholders in 
the debate over banning autonomous weapon systems often speak past 
each other. And, as discussions of autonomy in weapon systems are 
“fraught with terms that are both loaded and vague,”11 they can easily 
become heated and unproductive—especially as none of the 
aforementioned definitions provide an appropriate orientation for 
 
 10 The term “semi-autonomous” is somewhat misleading, as it implies that autonomy in 
weapon systems is not a binary characteristic. However, in accordance with other writing in the 
field, this Article uses it to describe weapon systems that have some autonomous capabilities but 
which cannot independently select and engage targets. A drone that suggests a target to a human 
operator, but which cannot engage that target without approval, would be semi-autonomous; a 
drone which could select and engage targets post-deployment without human involvement would 
be autonomous. As discussed below, this distinction is complicated by the fact that otherwise 
autonomous weapon systems may be operated in semi-autonomous modes. 
 11 William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next 
Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1143 (2013). 
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defining “autonomy” for weapon systems in the context of treaty 
negotiations. A treaty banning or regulating a class of weaponry is 
fundamentally a legal instrument memorializing an agreement between 
states.12 To draft a treaty regarding the creation, use, or transfer of 
autonomous weapon systems, it is necessary to determine what 
“autonomy” in weapon systems entails from a law of armed conflict 
perspective. 
While developments in technology regularly challenge basic 
precepts of law, autonomous weapon systems threaten one of the law of 
armed conflict’s most fundamental assumptions: that, ultimately, a 
human being decides whether another human being lives or dies. 
Various automated weapon systems, like anti-personnel landmines, 
have tested this principle in the past, but the prospect of a fully 
autonomous weapon system strikes a more visceral note. As former U.S. 
Major General Robert Latiff describes it, “[f]ull lethal autonomy is no 
mere next step in military strategy: [i]t will be the crossing of a moral 
Rubicon.”13 No longer will responsibility for the consequences of a 
decision to use lethal force be directly traceable to a human operator; 
instead, responsibility may rest with the operator, the military 
commander, the programmer, the manufacturer, the weapon system 
itself, or some combination thereof. Thus, part of the purpose of a 
definition for autonomy in weapon systems from a law of armed conflict 
perspective is to distinguish between traditional weaponry and 
associated responsibility regimes and this new form.14 Accordingly, the 
distinctions between a non-autonomous, semi-autonomous, and 
autonomous weapon systems should turn on the level of human 
involvement necessary for the system to exercise lethal force against a 
specific target. 
In attempting to evaluate levels of human control, it is tempting to 
rely on an engineer’s definition of robotic autonomy. But engineers do 
not measure robotic autonomy along a single continuum; instead, 
machines are understood as progressively more autonomous based on 
various qualities, including how frequently the robot must be in contact 
with a human operator, how well it functions in response to increasing 
levels of uncertainty in its environment, and its “assertiveness”—its 
ability to alter its operating plan to complete its mission.15 Evaluating 
 
 12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 13 Robert H. Latiff & Patrick J. McCloskey, Opinion, With Drone Warfare, America 
Approaches the Robo-Rubicon, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2013, 7:37 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324128504578346333246145590. 
 14 See Asaro, supra note 4, at 695 (“It is the delegation of the human decision-making 
responsibilities to an autonomous system designed to take human lives that is the central moral 
and legal issue.”). 
 15 Marra & McNeil, supra note 11, at 1151–55; see also ANDREW P. WILLIAMS, 
MULTINATIONAL CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN (MCDC), TYPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: 
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autonomy along these different axes introduces a confusing and 
unnecessary level of particularity. Not only might a weapon system have 
varying levels of autonomy with regard to each of these three attributes, 
it may have differing amounts of autonomy with regard to each of these 
qualities at each stage of the “OODA Loop” (a simplified description of 
human decisionmaking as a four-step process: Observe, Orient, Decide, 
Act).16 One weapon system might be extremely assertive at the Observe 
and Orient stages, but not at the Decision and Action stages; another 
might have a high degree of independence at the Action stage, but not at 
the Observe, Orient, or Decide stages. These varying levels of autonomy 
along multiple cognitive axes at the four stages of the OODA Loop 
result in complicated and difficult-to-compare technical distinctions. 
Although these gradations may be extremely useful in research and 
development,17 they are unnecessarily precise for a legal document that 
is ultimately concerned with regulating weaponry that might 
independently exercise lethal force. In fact, a purely mechanical 
definition of autonomy for weapon systems might have the perverse 
effect of distinguishing among different weapon systems for technical 
reasons regardless of whether they operate similarly in practice, or vice 
versa. 
Instead, a relevant definition of autonomy for weapon systems 
should turn on whether a human being’s affirmative action is necessary 
for a weapon system to use lethal force against a specific target. The 
definition ultimately proposed in this Article therefore conceives of 
autonomy in weapon systems as both a binary characteristic and as 
existing along as spectrum. A given weapon system will or will not be 
autonomous,18 but autonomous weapon systems may have differing 
degrees of autonomous capabilities. 
 
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS FOCUS AREA 18–28 (2014) (collecting and discussing problems with 
various scales of machine autonomy); Paul Scharre & Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to 
Autonomy in Weapon Systems 5–7 (Feb. 2015) (working paper), available at 
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20
Paper_021015_v02.pdf (discussing three independent dimensions of weapons autonomy: the 
human-machine command-and-control relationship, the machine’s complexity, and the type of 
function being automated). 
 16 See Marra & McNeil, supra note 11, at 1144–45; see also id. at 1146–49 (comparing how a 
human being and machine might make a decision based on the OODA loop framework). 
 17 For example, the Air Force Research Lab employs an eleven-level spectrum of robotic 
autonomy, which requires an analysis of how much independence a given system has with regard 
to the four OODA tasks to determine its overall level of autonomy. See id. at 1157–58. 
 18 See Mark Gubrud, Autonomy Without Mystery: Where Do You Draw the Line?, 1.0 HUM. 
(May 9, 2014), http://gubrud.net/?p=272 (arguing for a definition of “human control” that is “free 
of degrees of meaning”). 
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B.     Existing Definitions and Their Problems 
The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) definition, which was 
made public in a 2013 Directive, is currently the best and most 
commonly cited definition for autonomous weapon systems. While the 
definition standing alone is useful, the Directive’s ambiguities invite 
certain misreadings and fail to logically distinguish between 
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems. 
Few legal scholars have advanced alternative definitions. To the 
extent other definitions have been stated or may be inferred, they tend 
to be either overly inclusive or exclusive. Some set the bar for autonomy 
in weapon systems too low, eliding important distinctions between 
different levels of human involvement. Others set the bar too high, 
effectively defining autonomous weapon systems out of existence and 
thereby ignoring a host of issues associated with weapon systems in use 
today. Finally, some definitions propose distinctions based on factors 
which might be highly relevant in other fields, such as engineering or 
philosophy, but which are less appropriate when attempting to evaluate 
relative levels of human control over target selection and engagement. 
1.     The DoD’s Definition 
In its 2013 Directive, the DoD defined “autonomous weapon 
systems” as ones which, “once activated, can select and engage targets 
without further intervention by a human operator. This includes 
human-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to 
allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but 
can select and engage targets without further human input after 
activation.”19 
This definition has a number of advantages. By beginning with 
“once activated,” it highlights how human beings are initially 
responsible for the decision to deploy autonomous weapon systems. It 
underscores the fact that it is the delegation of target selection and 
engagement (as opposed to other functions or tasks, such as piloting) to 
a machine that makes a weapon system an “autonomous weapon 
system.” It also does not create an unnecessary distinction between 
“autonomous” and “fully autonomous” weapon systems:20 rather, a 
system’s autonomy is determined solely by whether it “can select and 
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” 
 
 19 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09: AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13–14 
(2012) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 3000.09]. 
 20 See infra Part I.C.4.c. 
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Finally, it spells out that autonomy for weapon systems depends on the 
system’s capability for autonomous action—not whether it is supervised 
in practice or used in that capacity. 
Unfortunately, this apparently clear definition is muddied by the 
Directive’s attempt to distinguish between “autonomous” and “semi-
autonomous” weapon systems. It defines the latter as those which “once 
activated, [are] intended to only engage individual targets or specific 
target groups that have been selected by a human operator.”21 At first, 
this distinction seems appropriate: autonomous weapon systems “can 
select and engage targets without further intervention,” but semi-
autonomous weapon systems may “only engage [targets] selected by a 
human operator.” But the crucial distinguishing factor between 
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems in these 
definitions—human responsibility for target selection—is vague, and 
the provided examples of semi-autonomous weapon systems confuse 
rather than clarify.22 
According to the Directive, semi-autonomous weapon systems 
include those “that employ autonomy for engagement-related 
functions . . . provided that human control is retained over the decision 
to select individual targets and specific target groups for engagement” 
and “‘[f]ire and forget’ or lock-on-after-launch homing munitions that 
rely on [tactics, techniques, and procedures] to maximize the probability 
that the only targets within the seeker’s acquisition basket when the 
seeker activates are those individual targets or specific target groups that 
have been selected by a human operator.”23 Presumably, targets 
preselected by human operators would need to be fairly specific, limited, 
or predictable to preserve a meaningful distinction between semi-
autonomous and autonomous weapon systems.24  
Guided munitions that “lock on” prior to launch easily meet the 
specificity requirement. Those which “lock on” afterwards are more 
problematic. The Directive defines as “semi-autonomous” any homing 
munition that, after deployment, independently identifies targets and 
engages them based on tactics, techniques, and procedures proscribed 
by a human operator.25 The DoD does not consider this autonomous 
“target selection,” insofar as constraints on what the munition may 
target are determined by a human being and its infrastructure. But this 
blurs the line between autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon 
systems, as autonomous weapon systems will also operate under an 
 
 21 DOD DIR. 3000.09, supra note 19, at 14. 
 22 See Gubrud, supra note 18 (discussing ambiguities in the DoD’s definition of target 
selection). 
 23 DOD DIR. 3000.09, supra note 19, at 14. 
 24 See infra Part I.C.4.a. 
 25 DOD DIR. 3000.09, supra note 19, at 14. 
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array of preprogrammed and practical constraints; an autonomous 
weapon system will not simply be directed to “eliminate the enemy.” 
Some have therefore concluded that such “lock-on-after-launch homing 
munitions” actually are making lethal decisions autonomously—and, as 
the Directive “places no upper limit on the sophistication of the sensors 
and computers or complexity of the algorithms,” nor does it limit 
“homing munitions” to flying objects, “this is a loophole The 
Terminator could walk through.”26 
Additionally, the Directive’s definition of semi-autonomous 
weapon systems sometimes privileges form over function. In one case, 
“human control . . . over the decision to select individual targets and 
specific target groups for engagement” could constitute a human 
operator identifying and selecting targets, while the weapon system 
merely exercises autonomy in “providing terminal guidance to home in 
on” them.27 In another, “human control” might consist only of a human 
being not vetoing the engagement of a target the weapon system had 
acquired, tracked, identified, and prioritized—and which possibly poses 
an incoming threat which must be neutralized as quickly as possible, 
leaving little time for considered evaluation of the situation.28 In the 
latter case, the human being only nominally exercises control, insofar as 
he tacitly approves an engagement—the weapon system is effectively 
using lethal force with no genuine human supervision or involvement.29 
Shortly before this Article was finalized for publication, the Center 
for New American Security’s Ethical Autonomy project advanced a new 
definition intended to address some of these concerns.30 It defines an 
autonomous weapon system as “a weapon system that, once activated, is 
intended to select and engage targets where a human has not decided 
those specific targets are to be engaged.”31 It distinguishes these from 
“human-supervised autonomous weapon systems,” which have “the 
characteristics of an autonomous weapon system, but with the ability for 
human operators to monitor the weapon system’s performance and 
intervene to halt its operation, if necessary.”32 It also distinguishes a 
“semi-autonomous weapon” as one which “incorporates autonomy into 
one or more targeting functions and, once activated, is intended to only 
engage individual targets or specific groups of target[s] that a human 
has decided are to be engaged.”33 
 
 26 Gubrud, supra note 18. But see Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 15, at 8–10 (arguing that 
both types of guided munitions engage only targets preselected by a human operator). 
 27 DOD DIR. 3000.09, supra note 19, at 14. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See infra Part I.C.4.b–c. 
 30 Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 15, at 16. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
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These definitions share some of the positive qualities of the 
Directive’s definition, in that they highlight the importance of target 
selection and engagement and the human decision to activate the 
weapon system. They also improve upon the Directive’s definition by 
clarifying the role of human decisionmaking and the importance of the 
specificity of the preselected target. 
Unfortunately, these definitions create a different type of 
confusion. The distinction between “autonomous weapon systems” and 
“human-supervised autonomous weapon systems” is phrased as a 
technical one, insofar as the latter permit human monitoring and 
intervention. But this raises two issues. First, because nothing in the 
definition for “human-supervised” systems requires such monitoring 
and intervention, this distinction might be rendered moot if, in practice, 
such systems are operated without supervision. Second, despite being 
cast as technical, this distinction is ultimately a question of possible 
usage or modes, not autonomy. As such, it may well be important—
even crucial—in creating research and design regulations, but not in 
differentiating between autonomous and non- or semi-autonomous 
systems.34 
2.     Irrelevant Distinctions 
There are a number of definitions cited in the literature on banning 
autonomous weapon systems that introduce distinctions between “non-
autonomous” and “autonomous” weapon systems which, while likely 
useful in certain contexts, are irrelevant when constructing a regulatory 
treaty’s definition—usually because they fail to account for the level of 
human involvement in the decision to use lethal force. 
For example, the DoD’s Roadmap appears to define “automatic” 
unmanned systems as those which cannot “initially define the path 
according to some given goal or to choose the goal that is dictating its 
path.”35 An “autonomous system,” in contrast, “is self-directed by 
choosing the behavior it follows to reach a human-directed goal.”36 
Putting aside the fact that all robotic systems will be extensively 
preprogrammed and the difficulty in determining when a system’s 
controlling algorithms become sufficiently complex to state that it is 
“choosing” its actions, the Roadmap’s distinction turns on the level of 
independence the system has in accomplishing a goal—which has 
nothing to do with what the goal is. Should the goal require selecting 
 
 34 See infra Part I.C.4.c. 
 35 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP FY 2013–2038, at 66 
(2013) [hereinafter DOD ROADMAP]. 
 36 Id. at 67. 
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and engaging targets, the degree of human involvement is highly 
relevant. But weapon systems need not have destructive goals: one 
useful weapon system might be an autonomous version of the U.S. 
Miniature Air Launched Decoy Jammer, an air vehicle designed to 
“confuse and deceive enemy [integrated air defense systems]” by 
cruising in enemy territory, emitting decoy signals, and jamming the 
electromagnetic spectrum.37 
Similarly, Noel Sharkey, a Professor of Artificial Intelligence and 
Robotics at the University of Sheffield and a current Chair of the 
International Committee for Robot Arms Control, defines an 
“automatic” robot as one which “carries out a pre-programmed 
sequence of operations or moves in a structured environment.”38 In 
contrast, he defines an “autonomous” robot as “similar to an automatic 
machine except that it operates in open or unstructured environments. 
The robot is still controlled by a program but now receives information 
from its sensors that enable it to adjust the speed and direction of its 
motors (and actuators) as specified by the program.”39 According to this 
distinction, the question of a weapon system’s autonomy might depend 
on the environment in which it is employed—and not on its task or, 
should the task involve lethal force, on the level of human involvement. 
A stationary weapon system operating in a constrained area would be 
automatic—but that same weapon operating in an unstructured 
environment would be autonomous. But what constitutes a “structured” 
environment in warfare? Additionally, to the extent this definition 
depends on where a weapon system is deployed, it would make the 
enforcement of a ban on “autonomous” weaponry impossible. Despite 
this irrelevant distinction, Sharkey’s definition has pervaded discussions 
regarding what weapon systems should be included in a ban. The 
authors of Losing Humanity, for example, cite Sharkey for their claim 
that many weapon systems in use today with “a significant degree of 
autonomy because they can sense and attack targets with minimal 
human input” nonetheless are “better classified as automatic.”40 
3.     Setting the Bar for Autonomy Too Low 
There are a few proffered definitions that set the bar for autonomy 
so low that they lump together wide varieties of existing and potential 
weapons, and therefore “almost certainly [miss] the essence of what is 
 
 37 Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD), RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/
capabilities/products/mald (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 38 Noel Sharkey, Comment, Automating Warfare: Lessons Learned from the Drones, 21 J.L. 
INFO. & SCI. 140, 141 (2011). 
 39 Id. 
 40 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 12. 
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new about autonomous weapons.”41 Under these definitions, the most 
rudimentary landmine and Hal 9000 from 2001: A Space Odyssey are 
equivalently “autonomous.” 
Peter Asaro, a Professor of Philosophy who studies the 
implications of military robotics, defines autonomous weapon systems 
as “any automated system that can initiate lethal force without the 
specific, conscious, and deliberate decision of a human operator, 
controller, or supervisor.”42 Admirably, Asaro is concerned with 
ensuring meaningful human control over life-and-death decisions. But 
his definition elides important distinctions between weapon systems 
with vastly different levels of human involvement in the decision to use 
lethal force. 
Mark Gubrud, a member of the International Committee on Robot 
Arms Control, argues that “[w]e should . . . seek principles and 
definitions that point, as directly as possible to a Yes or No answer to 
the question, ‘Is this an autonomous weapon?’”43 Given the need for a 
clear definition for autonomy in weapon systems, Gubrud is asking the 
right question. But his solution—“A system is autonomous if it is 
operating without further human intervention”44—is incomplete. Even 
assuming that he meant to limit his definition of autonomy to systems 
capable of using lethal force, Gubrud’s definition includes weapon 
systems with vastly disparate levels of human involvement. 
4.     Setting the Bar for Autonomy Too High 
Notwithstanding the DoD’s calm pronouncement that “[h]uman-
supervised autonomous weapon systems may be used to select and 
engage targets,”45 most legal scholars assume that autonomous weapon 
systems do not yet exist.46 This conclusion is usually grounded in 
alternative definitions of autonomy for weapon systems, which tend to 
have two complimentary issues: an overly broad definition of non-
autonomous (usually termed “automated” or “automatic”) weapon 
systems, and an overly narrow definition of autonomous weapon 
 
 41 Paul Scharre, Autonomy, “Killer Robots,” and Human Control in the Use of Force—Part I, 
JUST SECURITY (July 9, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://justsecurity.org/12708/autonomy-killer-robots-
human-control-force-part [hereinafter Scharre, Autonomy I]; cf. Michael C. Horowitz & Paul 
Scharre, Do Killer Robots Save Lives?, POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2014/11/killer-robots-save-lives-113010_full.html?print#.VICWzWds2dx 
(discussing concerns that ban advocates are setting the bar for “killer robots” inappropriately low 
to encompass life-saving precision-guided munitions). 
 42 Asaro, supra note 4, at 694. 
 43 Gubrud, supra note 18. 
 44 Id. 
 45 DOD DIR. 3000.09, supra note 19, at 3. 
 46 See supra note 2. 
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systems. Such definitions are problematic, however, insofar as they 
ignore the fact that weapon systems in use today can make independent 
determinations regarding the selection and engagement of targets. 
The U.K. Ministry of Defence defines “autonomous systems” as 
capable of understanding higher level intent and direction. From this 
understanding and its perception of its environment, such a system is 
able to take appropriate action to bring about a desired state. It is 
capable of deciding a course of action, from a number of alternatives, 
without depending on human oversight and control, although these 
may still be present. Although the overall activity of an autonomous 
unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual actions may not 
be.47 
It continues: 
Autonomous systems will, in effect, be self-aware and their response 
to inputs indistinguishable from, or even superior to, that of a 
manned aircraft. As such, they must be capable of achieving the same 
level of situational understanding as a human. . . . As computing and 
sensor capability increases, it is likely that many systems, using very 
complex sets of control rules, will appear and be described as 
autonomous systems, but as long as it can be shown that the system 
logically follows a set of rules or instructions and is not capable of 
human levels of situational understanding, then they should only be 
considered to be automated.48 
This position exemplifies the problems inherent in setting the bar 
for weapon systems’ autonomy too high. Robots are unlikely to achieve 
“the same level of situational understanding as a human”49 any time 
soon, rendering any policies based on this definition largely 
hypothetical. A weapon system that independently selects and engages 
targets based on gathered data or even on in-field learning would be 
classified as merely “automated” as long as it didn’t have human-level 
cognitive capabilities. Thus, although the United Kingdom has publicly 
stated a policy against employing autonomous weapon systems, it has 
minimal practical impact or import.50 
 
 47 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 2/11: THE UK APPROACH TO 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 2-3 (2011). 
 48 Id. at 2-3 to 2-4. 
 49 Id. at 2-3. 
 50 See Sharkey, supra note 38, at 141 (critiquing this definition on the grounds that “no system 
is capable of ‘understanding’ never mind ‘understanding higher level intent’”); see also NICHOLAS 
MARSH, PEACE RESEARCH INST. OSLO, DEFINING THE SCOPE OF AUTONOMY: ISSUES FOR THE 
CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS 2 (2014) (discussing Sharkey’s critique). 
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C.     A Clarified Definition 
Given the ambiguities and problems attendant upon other 
definitions, this section suggests a clarified definition of “autonomous 
weapon system,” meant to highlight the unique issues such weaponry 
poses from a law of armed conflict perspective: 
An “autonomous weapon system” is a weapon system that, based on 
conclusions derived from gathered information and preprogrammed 
constraints, is capable of independently selecting and engaging targets. 
The remainder of this section elaborates upon different aspects of this 
definition. 
1.     “An ‘autonomous weapon system’ is a weapon system that, . . . ” 
A “weapon system” is “[a] combination of one or more weapons 
with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of 
delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.”51 
For autonomous weapon systems, this may include varying 
combinations of physical mechanisms and nonphysical code or 
software. 
A weapon system need not include lethal weapons; certain 
weapons are “explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to 
incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, 
permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and 
the environment.”52 
It also bears noting that weapon systems are not necessarily 
embodied entities: computer viruses, worms, and other malware may 
also operate automatically or autonomously. Although much about 
Stuxnet, a computer worm discovered in early 2010, is shrouded in 
secrecy, it was apparently designed to attack industrial Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLCs)—specifically, Iranian PLCs controlling 
centrifuges used for enriching weapons-grade uranium.53 At some point 
between late 2009 and early 2010, Iran replaced approximately 1000 
centrifuges at its Natanz plant, which has been widely attributed to 
damage caused by Stuxnet.54 Whether Stuxnet succeeded in its mission 
is unknown: 
 
 51 Weapon System, DOD DICTIONARY MIL. TERMS, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_
dictionary/data/w/7965.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 52 Nonlethal Weapon, DOD DICTIONARY MIL. TERMS, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_
dictionary/data/n/11245.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 53 Stuxnet was likely developed by the United States and Israel. David E. Sanger, Obama 
Order Sped up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1. 
 54 DAVID ALBRIGHT, PAUL BRANNAN & CHRISTINA WALROND, INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SEC., 
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If Stuxnet’s goal was the destruction of all the centrifuges in the [Fuel 
Enrichment Plants], Stuxnet failed. But if its goal was to destroy a 
more limited number of centrifuges and set back Iran’s progress in 
operating [Fuel Enrichment Plants] while making detection of the 
malware difficult, it may have succeeded, at least for a while.55 
But one thing is clear: Stuxnet was a code-based weapon system, albeit 
one without lethal effect.56 
2.     “. . . based on conclusions derived from gathered information and 
preprogrammed constraints, . . . ” 
This clause attempts to distinguish between “automated” and 
“autonomous” weapon systems. Both may gather information, both may 
operate under preprogrammed constraints, and both may engage targets 
independent of human intervention. But while automated weapon 
systems merely react to triggers, autonomous weapon systems process 
information to derive conclusions before responding.57 For example, a 
typical landmine is an automated weapon that uses gathered 
information—such as a tug on a tripwire or pressure on a sensor—to 
trigger an explosion without human involvement or oversight. A 
landmine with autonomous capabilities, however, might be triggered to 
react by a similar tug or pressure, but it would then use algorithms to 
process data (possibly to determine whether or not the trigger was due 
to a child or a tank) and, based on its calculations, reach a conclusion 
about whether or not to explode. More advanced weapon systems with 
autonomous capabilities might even make probabilistic calculations, 
deploy different graduated outcomes based on environmental factors, or 
learn from prior experiences. 
This clause might be criticized—with some justification—as 
attempting to draw an arbitrary line in the sand. From a certain 
perspective, a landmine that is triggered and then explodes seems to be 
just a simplistic version of a landmine that evaluates the weight of a 
trigger before exploding—both operate after activation without further 
human intervention. Any attempt to distinguish between autonomous 
and non-autonomous weapon systems based on their complexity will 
 
DID STUXNET TAKE OUT 1,000 CENTRIFUGES AT THE NATANZ ENRICHMENT PLANT? 1 (2010). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, Aileen Nowlan, William 
Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 839–40 (2012) 
(discussing various types of cyber-attacks, including Stuxnet). 
 57 In other words, autonomous weapon systems “select among” potential targets; automated 
ones are simply triggered. Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner & Matthew Waxman, Adapting the 
Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 386, 388 (2014). 
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run into a similar line-drawing problem, which might argue for striking 
this clause entirely.58 
That concern being acknowledged, the fact that a weapon system is 
capable of at least a minimal level of independent analysis does seem to 
be a relevant distinction. This clause highlights that an autonomous 
weapon systems, like any robotic or code-based system, is controlled by 
a program.59 These programs may be created by human beings or by 
other programs, and their constraints may include anything from the 
law of armed conflict to specific parameters of a given mission. Even 
weapon systems with in-field machine learning capabilities will be 
constrained in what they can learn and do by their programs. Thus, 
even though autonomous weapon systems’ responses to certain 
environments or events may be largely predictable—just as the actions 
of an autonomous human being may be largely predictable—there 
seems to be an important distinction between deterministic “automatic” 
or “automated” responses and those based on collected and analyzed 
information.60 
3.     “. . . is capable of . . . ” 
The DoD’s definition states that a weapon system’s autonomy 
depends on whether it “can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator,” and thus the definition “includes 
human-supervised autonomous weapon systems” as a subset of 
autonomous weapon systems.61 Notwithstanding this clarity, 
subsequent writers relying on this definition often imply that human-
supervised systems are distinct from autonomous weapon systems. To 
address this frequent misreading, this clarified definition expands the 
Directive’s “can” to “is capable of.” 
 
 58 See Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 15, at 6 (“[T]here are no clear boundaries between 
these degrees of complexity, from ‘automatic’ to ‘automated’ to ‘autonomous’ to ‘intelligent,’ and 
different people may disagree on what to call any given system.”). 
 59 See Sharkey, supra note 38, at 141. 
 60 It bears noting that, while the predictability of a weapon system’s response to a situation 
may be a crucial consideration in a commander’s decision to deploy the weapon, see infra Part 
II.B, the nature of the environment and the predictability of a weapon system’s response to it is 
irrelevant for determining whether or not the system is autonomous. 
 61 DOD DIR. 3000.09, supra note 19, at 13 (emphasis added). “[H]uman-supervised 
autonomous weapon systems” are defined as autonomous weapon systems “designed to provide 
human operators with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements, including in the event 
of a weapon system failure, before unacceptable levels of damage occur.” Id. at 14. 
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4.     “. . . independently selecting and engaging targets.” 
As many have intuited, the fundamental distinction between semi-
autonomous and autonomous weapon systems is that the latter are 
capable of selecting and engaging targets—which may include human 
beings, objects, or even code—without human intervention, while the 
former cannot. But what does target selection and engagement entail? 
Complete freedom to decide who lives or dies? Bounded selection or 
implementation capabilities based on preprogrammed constraints? 
Prioritizing one specific preselected target over another? 
Under this definition, the distinction turns on whether a weapon 
system uses its autonomous capabilities to select and engage a target. 
Thus, an autonomous weapon system could either operate with no 
constraints or with preprogrammed boundaries—the important fact 
would be that it gathered and processed information in the course of 
target selection and engagement. A semi-autonomous weapon system, 
in contrast, might act autonomously in functions related to target 
selection or engagement—including acquiring, tracking, prioritizing, or 
determining when or how to engage specific targets—but a human 
operator would need to take some affirmative action before it would be 
capable of both selecting and engaging a target. 
a.     Specific Versus General Targets 
“Specific” is a key word here—as noted above, to the extent targets 
are preselected by human operators, the selections would need to be 
quite precise to preserve a meaningful distinction between semi-
autonomous and autonomous weapon systems. Thus, semi-
autonomous weapon systems might use autonomous capabilities to 
engage a particular preselected target, while autonomous weapon 
systems might be charged with engaging targets with certain 
characteristics. 
To grasp this distinction, it helps to consider the Roomba, a 
popular autonomous vacuum cleaning robot with various cleaning 
modes. In the “SPOT mode,” a human being selects a particular area for 
focused cleaning and the Roomba “moves in a slow spiral pattern over 
the soiled area.”62 If it encounters a wall or other object, it “will 
intelligently keep cleaning in the focused area.”63 In the “CLEAN mode,” 
the Roomba “calculate[s] the room size and maximize[s] coverage-per-
room based on information it receives through its sensors.”64 In each of 
 
 62 Service & Support – FAQs: Roomba’s Cleaning Modes, IROBOT, 
http://uksupport.irobot.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/863/~/roombas-cleaning-modes (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2014). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
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these modes, the Roomba is employing autonomous capabilities to 
accomplish a human-set task. And its goal in each mode is similar: to 
clean the floor. However, the human operator is selecting a “target” in 
the semi-autonomous SPOT mode, while the human operator is 
essentially charging the Roomba with selecting “targets” in a designated 
“battlefield” in the autonomous CLEAN mode.  
b.     Sufficient Time for an Affirmative Action 
Some affirmative action from a human operator with regard to the 
selected target is also necessary to distinguish semi-autonomous from 
autonomous weapon systems. Where a human being merely has 
supervisory power, the weapon system is for all intents and purposes 
autonomously selecting and engaging the target. 
But what constitutes an “affirmative action”? Choosing not to 
exercise veto power can hardly be sufficient—but requiring too much 
human involvement risks setting the bar for autonomy too low and 
grouping weapon systems with widely and importantly distinct levels of 
required human involvement together. 
To evaluate the implications of this standard, it helps to consider 
weapon systems currently in use. The U.S. Phalanx Close In Weapons 
Systems (CIWS or Sea Whiz)—affectionately called “R2-D2s” by 
Americans or “Daleks” by Brits because of their barrel-like shape—are 
mounted on ships and provide a last-ditch defense against incoming 
high-speed, anti-ship missiles and low-level aircraft.65 It collects data in 
real time; identifies potential targets; evaluates whether they pose a 
threat based on whether they are approaching the ship, capable of 
maneuvering to hit the ship, and traveling within a certain velocity; and 
engages them—but allows for a manual override.66 The CIWS can be 
employed under the Aegis combat system,67 which has four modes, 
ranging from “semiautomatic,” where a human operator controls 
decisions regarding the use of lethal force, to “casualty,” which assumes 
 
 65 John Pike, MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-15.htm (last updated Jan. 9, 2003); Robert 
H. Stoner, R2D2 with Attitude: The Story of the Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), 
NAVWEAPS, http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-103.htm (last updated Oct. 30, 2009). 
 66 Pike, supra note 65; Stoner, supra note 65. The U.S. Navy is currently testing a more 
advanced CIWS: the SeaRam CIWS Anti-Ship Missile Defense System “automatically detects, 
evaluates, tracks, engages, and performs kill assessment against [anti-ship missiles] and high 
speed aircraft threats in an extended self defense battle space envelope around the ship.” United 
States Navy Fact File: SeaRam Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) Anti-Ship Missile Defense System, 
U.S. NAVY, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=456&ct=2 (last 
updated Nov. 15, 2013). 
 67 See Stoner, supra note 65. 
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that the human operators are incapacitated and therefore permits the 
system to use defensive force independently.68 
A land-based variant of the U.S. Navy’s CIWS is the Centurion, 
which was part of the Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) 
initiative and was originally deployed in Iraq in 2005.69 According to 
reports, C-RAM systems have successfully intercepted over 100 
rockets.70 Similarly, Israel’s Iron Dome, which currently is the only dual 
C-RAM and Very Short Range Air Defense system, intercepted over 150 
rockets fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip prior to the July 2014 
conflict.71 In that conflict, the Iron Dome was credited with shooting 
down ninety-percent of Palestinian rockets it engaged—leading to 
“‘Iron Dome tourism,’ where the public, reassured by the system’s 
performance, stay outdoors to watch the shoot-downs rather than 
taking cover.”72 
Are these semi-autonomous or autonomous weapon systems? If 
specific target selection and engagement depends on any affirmative 
action of a human operator, the U.S. C-RAM system and the Israeli Iron 
Dome would be classified as semi-autonomous. They both identify a 
threat and send a recommended response to a human operator, who 
must then decide within seconds whether to give the command to fire.73 
Once provided with authorization, the system then determines when to 
fire and how to guide the intercepting missile to neutralize the threat. 
When a defensive system only permits a human supervisor to veto a 
determination to select and engage a target, however, it would be an 
autonomous weapon system. Thus, although the U.S. Navy’s 
CIWS/Aegis system allows for a manual override,74 to the extent it has 
the capability to select and engage targets with no further human 
 
 68 Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 287 (2011). 
 69  Stoner, supra note 65. Because these are used on land, where there is a greater risk to 
civilians, the C-RAM’s rounds explode either on impact or upon tracer burnout. Id. 
 70 Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System Completes Mission in Iraq, NAVSEA (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.navsea.navy.mil/Lists/NewsWires/DispForm.aspx?ID=12. Additionally, having a C-
RAM system may have had a deterrent effect. As the system manager noted, “‘[w]e have logged 
numerous successful intercepts, but we don’t know how many attacks didn’t take place once they 
realized there was a defense system deployed.’” Id. 
 71 Iron Dome, RAFAEL ADVANCED DEF. SYS. LTD., http://www.rafael.co.il/Marketing/186-
1530-en/Marketing.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 72 Dan Williams, Israel Says Iron Dome Scores 90 Percent Rocket Interception Rate, REUTERS, 
July 10, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/10/us-palestinians-israel-
irondome-idUSKBN0FF0XA20140710. 
 73 See Iron Dome Battle Management Demonstrated, DEF. UPDATE, http://defense-
update.com/photos/iron_dome_bms.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (noting that the system 
“requests the operator’s permission to launch the missiles”); Paul Scharre, Reflections on the 
Chatham House Autonomy Conference, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2014, 5:34 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/guest-post-reflections-on-the-chatham-house-autonomy-
conference (stating that C-RAM systems do not have an autonomous mode). 
 74 Pike, supra note 65. 
CROOTOF.36.5.5 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:28 PM 
1860 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1837 
 
intervention, it is an autonomous weapon system. But is this distinction 
between the semi-autonomous C-RAM and Iron Dome and the 
autonomous CIWS/Aegis system sensible? 
On one hand, preserving this technical distinction may have some 
positive policy side effects. It has the benefit of clarity: any given weapon 
system can be definitively classed as semi-autonomous or autonomous. 
Militaries anxious to avoid potential restrictions on autonomous 
weapon systems may favor designs requiring some affirmative human 
action over designs that merely permit a veto, resulting in a clearer 
accountability chain for every engagement. Maintaining this distinction 
may also be useful in the ban debate, as both advocates and skeptics of a 
ban on autonomous weapon systems seem willing to exclude defensive 
systems with a human “in the loop” from any potential ban. 
On the other hand, requiring an affirmative action from a human 
operator in these charged circumstances begins to look more like a 
“rubber stamp” than a considered decision to select a specific target for 
engagement.75 To the extent the human supervisor’s affirmative action 
is rendered essentially irrelevant, given the superhuman nature of the 
required response time to an incoming threat, it seems unfair to hold 
him accountable for a decision to engage a selected target that was 
effectively made by the weapon system. 
This issue is compounded by psychological factors. First, human 
beings can place too much faith in computers, to the extent that an 
operator may trust a machine’s conclusion more than her own analysis. 
Second, while autonomous weapon systems may allow human operators 
to monitor multiple systems, studies have shown that a monitor’s 
attention declines as the number of monitored systems increases.76 
Stephen Knouse theorizes that when an individual knows her actions 
will be futile, she will lose the motivation to fulfill the duties of her 
position.77 Presumably, then, the operator of a weapon systems 
subconsciously concludes that her actions are irrelevant and therefore 
might “automatically” approve the engagement of potential targets.78 
Although there are regulatory reasons for preserving a technical 
distinction between semi-autonomous and autonomous weapon 
 
 75 See P. W. Singer, War of the Machines: A Dramatic Growth in the Military Use of Robots 
Brings Evolution in Their Conception, 303 SCI. AM. 56, 63 (2010) (noting that, in autonomous 
defensive systems, “the operator really only exercises veto power, and a decision to override a 
robot’s decision must be made in only half a second, with few willing to challenge what they view 
as the better judgment of the machine”); see also Jeffrey S. Thurnher, No One at the Controls: 
Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Targeting, 67 JOINT FORCE Q. 77, 83 (2012) (arguing that 
human oversight should be more than “merely a rubber stamp”). 
 76 Allyson Hauptman, Autonomous Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, 218 MIL. L. REV. 
170, 186 (2013). 
 77 Id. at 186 n.61. 
 78 See id. at 186. 
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systems based on whether a human being makes any affirmative action, 
a legal definition should aim to avoid creating distinctions between 
different weapon systems that operate similarly in practice. Given this, 
and given that the primary concern with autonomous weapon systems is 
about when the decision to use lethal force is delegated to a machine, for 
a weapon system to not be effectively autonomous, the human operator 
or supervisor must have sufficient time to evaluate the nature of the 
target, its military significance, and the likely incidental effects of 
engagement.79 What constitutes sufficient time for these calculations 
will vary based on the situation. 
c.     “Controllable” Versus “Fully” Autonomous Weapon Systems 
Understandably, many feel that there is an important distinction 
between human-supervised and entirely uncontrolled autonomous 
weapon systems. This intuition leads many to distinguish between 
weapon systems where human beings are “on the loop”—which many 
acknowledge are in use today—and “fully” autonomous weapon systems 
where human beings are entirely “off the loop”—which most conclude 
do not yet exist.80 
There are important policy implications to this distinction: it is 
necessary for constructing different best practices or administrative 
regulations,81 and having a human being responsible for supervising the 
actions of an autonomous weapon system might be critical for assigning 
responsibility should the system’s actions result in a violation of 
international or domestic law. Just because a weapon system may be 
capable of selecting and engaging targets without human intervention 
 
 79 This standard for distinguishing between semi-autonomous and effectively autonomous 
weapon systems draws from the International Committee on Robot Arms Control’s list of 
minimum necessary conditions for meaningful human control. See Frank Sauer, ICRAC 
Statement on Technical Issues to the 2014 UN CCW Expert Meeting, ICRAC (May 14, 2014), 
http://icrac.net/2014/05/icrac-statement-on-technical-issues-to-the-un-ccw-expert-meeting. 
However, the Committee would require that all of their conditions be met in every situation 
where a target is engaged, which would forbid the usage of many weapon systems currently being 
used. 
 80 See supra note 2; see also Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and 
International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. FEATURES 4–5, 
11 (2013), available at http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-
Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf (acknowledging that “U.S. forces have operated two human-
supervised autonomous systems for many years,” but nonetheless concluding that “fully 
autonomous weapon systems” are not being fielded by the United States); Scharre & Horowitz, 
supra note 15, at 16 (distinguishing between “autonomous weapon system[s]” and “human-
supervised autonomous weapon system[s]”); Lawand, supra note 8 (“A truly autonomous weapon 
system would be capable of searching for, identifying and applying lethal force to a target, 
including a human target (enemy combatants), without any human intervention or control. This 
definition connotes a mobile system with some form of artificial intelligence, capable of operating 
in a dynamic environment with no human control.”). 
 81 See DOD DIR. 3000.09, supra note 19, at 3 (distinguishing when and how autonomous and 
semi-autonomous weapon systems may be used). 
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does not mean it will or should be employed in that mode; indeed, there 
are significant ethical and practical arguments counseling against 
developing weapons that do not require an affirmative action from a 
human before employing lethal force.82 
But while distinguishing between human-supervised and 
unsupervised weapon systems may be important in developing best 
practices or regulations, it is irrelevant to the question of whether a 
given weapon system is autonomous.83 Such operation does not render 
the weapon system itself any less autonomous, it just means that its 
autonomous capabilities are not being fully utilized. If a weapon system 
has the capacity to independently select and engage targets, whether 
there is a human supervisor or whether it is operated in a semi-
autonomous mode is a question of usage—and thus regulation—and 
not of autonomy. Returning to the Roomba analogy: even if a human 
operator were to only use a Roomba in SPOT mode or only permitted it 
to use the CLEAN mode under active supervision, the Roomba would 
nonetheless remain an autonomous robot, as it would retain the 
capability to operate in the CLEAN mode. Accordingly, this definition 
does not differentiate between “controllable” and “fully” autonomous 
weapon systems. 
d.     Lethal Versus Non-Lethal Weapon Systems 
“Target engagement” usually entails committing to a violent or 
disruptive action to destroy or undermine the functioning of a target. It 
includes the use of lethal force, which consists of any action—bombing, 
stabbing, infecting, and so on—that is intended to or has a substantial 
risk of causing death, serious bodily harm, or injury. “Lethal force” may 
include force directed at human beings or force directed at objects, such 
 
 82 Writers with practical experience tend to argue that militaries are uninterested in 
developing or deploying autonomous weapon systems that do not have a human operator “on the 
loop,” as doing so “decreases the chances of weapons striking the wrong target, resulting in 
fratricide or civilian casualties, or that they simply miss their target entirely, wasting scarce and 
expensive munitions.” Paul Scharre, Autonomy, “Killer Robots,” and Human Control in the Use of 
Force—Part II, JUST SECURITY (July 9, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://justsecurity.org/12712/autonomy-
killer-robots-human-control-force-part-ii [hereinafter Scharre, Autonomy II]; see also Werner 
J.A. Dahm, Commentary, Killer Drones are Science Fiction, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2012, at A11 
(noting that there is currently no military disadvantage in keeping humans involved in decisions 
regarding engagement and therefore no demand to delegate that step); Charli Carpenter, US 
Public Opinion on Autonomous Weapons, DUCK MINERVA (June 2013), 
http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/UMass-Survey_
Public-Opinion-on-Autonomous-Weapons.pdf (finding, in a 2013 survey of 1000 Americans, 
that military personnel, veterans, and individuals with family in the military were more strongly 
opposed to autonomous weapons than the general public, with the highest opposition coming 
from active duty troops). 
 83 Similarly, it is inaccurate to consider an autonomous weapon system that is only operated 
in semi-autonomous modes, like the CIWS, merely a semi-autonomous weapon system. 
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as tanks, planes, ships, or buildings, whose destruction has a substantial 
risk of causing such injury to human beings. 
But what of autonomous weapon systems programmed to only 
target and engage objects whose destruction is unlikely to cause harm to 
human beings? To the extent that the concern with autonomous 
weapon systems is that human operators are inappropriately delegating 
the decision to use lethal force to machines, wouldn’t such weapon 
systems be acceptable? Put another way: Ban proponents aren’t 
concerned with autonomous weapon systems, but rather with lethal 
autonomous weapon systems. 
This definition does not, however, distinguish between lethal and 
non-lethal autonomous weapon systems. When a weapon system is 
capable of wielding destructive force, what it is preprogrammed to 
target is a question of how it is used, not of its autonomy. As a result, for 
the purposes of this definition, it is irrelevant whether a weapon system 
is engaging human or non-human targets or whether the system is being 
used for offensive or defensive purposes.84 
D.     Autonomous Weapon Systems in Use Today 
There is a nearly universal consensus, among both ban advocates 
and skeptics, that autonomous weapon systems do not yet exist.85 One 
of the more influential critiques of the pro-ban argument is that such 
weapon systems are “inevitable.”86 Under the clarified definition, 
however, it quickly becomes clear that autonomous weapon systems are 
not just inevitable—they already exist and have been deployed. 
 
 84 Granted, there are different levels of risks associated with weapon systems that engage only 
nonhuman targets than those which engage human targets. Such practical distinctions may be 
quite important in discussing the regulation (as opposed to a complete ban) of autonomous 
weapon systems. See infra Part IV.C.1.b. 
 85 See supra note 2. There are a few writers on the subject who acknowledge that some 
autonomous weapon systems are in use today. See MARSH, supra note 50, at 3; Ronald Arkin, 
Lethal Autonomous Systems and the Plight of the Non-Combatant, AISB Q., July 2013, at 6; 
Gubrud, supra note 18; Scharre, Autonomy II, supra note 82; see also Anderson, Reisner & 
Waxman, supra note 57, at 388–89 (“[S]everal modern highly-automated—and some would call 
them autonomous—weapon systems already exist.”); Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 2, at 235 
(noting that the United States has operated “two ‘human-supervised’ autonomous systems for 
many years—the Aegis at sea, and the Patriot on land”). 
  However, even these writers tend to limit autonomous weapons in use today to a few 
exceptions to the norm of nonautonomy. See MARSH, supra note 50, at 3 (discussing the U.K. 
Brimstone and other fire-and-forget missiles); Gubrud, supra note 18 (discussing fire-and-forget 
or lock-on-after-launch missiles); Scharre, Autonomy II, supra note 82 (discussing the Israeli 
Harpy and the PMK encapsulated torpedo mine). 
  Under the clarified definition, however, it becomes clear that many different types of 
autonomous weapon systems are currently in use, many of which have not been recognized in the 
literature as such. 
 86 Anderson & Waxman, supra note 4, at 2, 27. 
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1.     Levels of Autonomy 
While there will necessarily be a spectrum of weapons autonomy, 
ranging from a stone to the Terminator, there are four relevant 
classifications. As pictured below, from least to most autonomous, there 
are inert weapon systems, automated weapon systems, semi-
autonomous weapon systems, and autonomous weapon systems. 
 
Fig. 1: Levels of Autonomy 
 
 
If asked to list weapons, most would likely name some variant on 
“gun,” “knife,” or “sword.”87 When distinguishing between levels of 
weapon autonomy, all of these—and everything from a stone to the 
most advanced handheld firearm—could be classified as an “inert 
weapon,” as they are all objects requiring contemporaneous operation 
by a human being to be lethal. 
“Automated” weapon systems are purely reactive; although they 
may be deployed long before they engage a target, they merely follow 
commands or preprogrammed rules, without employing gathered 
information or algorithmic calculations to draw independent 
conclusions about how to react. A tripwire sentry gun will fire 
automatically after being triggered; an autonomous sentry will process 
data before firing. Thus, while both automated and autonomous 
 






• Traditional Landmine 





Munitions which use 




• C-RAM, Iron Dome 
• CIWS 
• Missiles which can select 
targets based on general 
characteristics 
CROOTOF.36.5.5 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:28 PM 
2015] THE K ILLER  ROBOT S ARE HERE  1865 
 
weapon systems may react to certain situations in a predictable manner, 
automated weapons have no “choice” in the matter. 
Semi-autonomous weapon systems have some autonomous 
capabilities, which may include functions relevant to target selection 
and engagement, but they cannot independently both select and engage 
targets. Some such systems might identify a potential target and await 
an operator’s approval before exercising lethal force; others might 
employ autonomy in determining how to carry out a strike against a 
preselected target. However, a human operator will still need to take 
some affirmative action to select a specific target for engagement. 
Finally, autonomous weapon systems are capable of selecting and 
engaging targets based on conclusions derived from gathered 
information and preprogrammed constraints, without any 
contemporaneous decisional support by a human being. They might 
operate in structured or unstructured environments; they may be 
mobile or stationary; they may have rudimentary artificial intelligence, 
be capable of in-field learning, or even have human-level reasoning; 
they may be supervised or entirely uncontrollable. While these factors 
are germane to whether they can be used in compliance with the law of 
armed conflict and in the construction of regulatory policies, they are 
irrelevant to the question of whether a particular weapon system is 
autonomous. 
2.     Incentives for Development 
A host of political, practical, and even ethical incentives appears to 
favor the development of increasingly autonomous weapon systems. Of 
course, there are also important considerations counseling against a 
headlong embrace of such weaponry.88 The aim of this subsection is not 
to join the debate as to whether governments should employ 
autonomous weapon systems, but rather to highlight the numerous 
reasons states are investing in related research. 
First, there are powerful political incentives for a state to replace or 
augment its human forces with robotic ones. The main one is 
 
 88 See, e.g., DOD DIR. 3000.09, supra note 19; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUMAN 
RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH., ADVANCING THE DEBATE ON KILLER ROBOTS: 12 KEY 
ARGUMENTS FOR A PREEMPTIVE BAN ON FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS (2014) [hereinafter 
ADVANCING THE DEBATE], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/
Advancing%20the%20Debate_8May2014_Final.pdf; LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2; Arkin, 
supra note 85, at 4–5; Asaro, supra note 4, at 692; see also Sarah Knuckey, Scientists from 37 
Countries Call for Ban on Autonomous Lethal Targeting, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 16, 2013, 11:56 
AM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/16/scientists-ban-autonomous-weapons-systems (reviewing 
legal, political, strategic, moral, and ethical arguments for and against autonomous weapon 
systems). 
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summarized nicely by a Navy chief petty officer on the loss of his unit’s 
PackBot: “‘when a robot dies, you don’t have to write a letter to its 
mother.’”89 In fact, a common argument for banning autonomous 
weapon systems is that they will make wars too easy.90 If politicians 
don’t need to provide reasons for entering a conflict that justify the loss 
of their constituents’ lives, this implicit check on armed conflicts might 
disappear—along with democratic peace theory.91 Increasingly 
autonomous weapon systems are also politically appealing because they 
make life safer for soldiers: they reduce the number of soldiers exposed 
to physically and psychologically dangerous situations while 
simultaneously creating jobs for (and therefore a need to train) highly 
skilled professionals. 
Second, autonomous weapon systems may simply be more 
effective and efficient weapons. Remotely-operated weapon systems 
usually require at least a one-to-one match of operators,92 but as semi-
autonomous and autonomous weapon systems proliferate, human 
operators will be able to monitor larger numbers of systems—possibly 
rendering individual operators more productive, requiring less total 
staff, and increasing total force projection.93 They may also extend the 
reach of any individual solider, allowing him to “see[] farther or strik[e] 
further.”94 Additionally, to the extent that remotely-operated systems 
are vulnerable to jamming or even takeover,95 increasing the weapons’ 
 
 89 P. W. Singer, Robots at War: The New Battlefield, 33 WILSON Q. 30, 31 (2009). 
 90 Id. at 47–48. Conversely, as “boots on the ground” are removed from the equation, 
politicians might find it easier to justify humanitarian interventions. See Anderson & Waxman, 
supra note 4, at 17–18 (discussing whether there is ever an “optimal” level of force). For a 
discussion of how autonomous weapon systems might make war politically easier and thereby 
affect the balance of the U.S. war power, see Rebecca Crootof, War, Responsibility, and Killer 
Robots, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2569298. 
 91 See Peter M. Asaro, How Just Could a Robot War Be?, in CURRENT ISSUES IN COMPUTING 
AND PHILOSOPHY 50, 56–59 (Adam Briggle, Katinka Waelbers & Philip Brey eds., 2008); Singer, 
supra note 89, at 48.  
 92 See Thurnher, supra note 75, at 79 (“It takes scores of people, from pilots to technicians to 
intelligence analysts, to operate a single tethered UAV.”). 
 93 See Marchant et al., supra note 68, at 275; Singer, supra note 89, at 41 (noting that when 
human operators control two UAVs at a time, their performance levels decrease by an average of 
fifty percent—which incentivizes increased autonomy for weapon systems); see also DOD 
ROADMAP, supra note 35, at 25 (noting that personnel costs are “the greatest single cost in DoD” 
and that “strides in autonomy . . . have reduced the number of personnel required, but much 
more work needs to occur”). 
 94 Marchant et al., supra note 68, at 275. 
 95 In June 2012, a team from the University of Texas at Austin led by Professor Todd 
Humphreys used “spoofing”—a hacker-created signal that infiltrates a drone’s GPS system—to 
take control of a drone in flight. John Roberts, EXCLUSIVE: Drones Vulnerable to Terrorist 
Hijacking, Researchers Say, FOXNEWS.COM (June 25, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/
06/25/drones-vulnerable-to-terrorist-hijacking-researchers-say. This may be how Iran allegedly 
captured a U.S. surveillance drone in December 2011. Adam Rawnsley, Iran’s Alleged Drone 
Hack: Tough, but Possible, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/2011/12/iran-
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autonomy and eliminating the need for a continuous link between the 
weapon system and the operator might improve its efficacy. The 
possibility of autonomous “persistent stare”—longer-term surveillance 
or independent evaluation of factors on the ground—might also 
improve precision targeting and reduce collateral damage.96 
Similarly, autonomous weapon systems may be preferable to 
human soldiers in certain situations or for certain activities. Werner 
Dahm, then-Chief Scientist of the U.S. Air Force, stated in 2010 that “by 
2030 machine capabilities will have increased to the point that humans 
will have become the weakest component in a wide array of systems and 
processes.”97 To a certain extent, this is already occurring: a Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency official has stated that human 
beings are becoming “the weakest link in defense systems.”98 
Additionally, whereas training a soldier in a task might take days, weeks, 
or even years, weapon systems can share knowledge almost 
instantaneously.99 They can quickly collect and integrate information 
from varied sources. They don’t get hungry, tired, bored, or sick. They 
are immune to biological and chemical weapons. They tackle the dirty, 
dangerous, and dull work without complaint. They can reach 
inaccessible areas and survive in inhospitable environments. They 
follow instructions to the letter. They need not be motivated by self-
preservation, and so may “be used in a self-sacrificing manner if needed 
and appropriate.”100 They are immune from psychological “scenario 
fulfillment,” which causes human beings to process new information in 
line with their preexisting beliefs and may sometimes result in 
“distortion or neglect of contradictory information in stressful 
situations.”101 They don’t act out of fear or anger, for vengeance or 
vainglory.102 Ronald Arkin, a roboticist and roboethicist working to 
 
drone-hack-gps (reporting on Iranian claims that “Iran managed to jam the drone’s 
communication links to American operators by forcing it to shift into autopilot mode. With its 
communications down, the drone allegedly kicked into autopilot mode, relying on GPS to fly 
back to base in Afghanistan. With the GPS autopilot on, the engineer claims Iran spoofed the 
drone’s GPS system with false coordinates, fooling it into thinking it was close to home and 
landing into Iran’s clutches.”). 
 96 See Arkin, supra note 85, at 1; Reeves & Johnson, supra note 4, at 26. 
 97 WERNER J.A. DAHM, U.S. AIR FORCE, REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY HORIZONS: A VISION FOR 
AIR FORCE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DURING 2010–2030, at 106 (2010) (Werner J.A. Dahm is the 
U.S. Air Force Chief Scientist (AF/ST)). 
 98 See Singer, supra note 89, at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99 Id. at 37–38. 
 100 RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 29 (2009). 
 101 Id. at 30–31. 
 102 However, it is not accurate to claim that autonomous weapon systems would never rape, 
massacre, or commit other war crimes; it all depends on how they are programmed and used. See 
Charli Carpenter, “Robot Soldiers Would Never Rape”: Un-packing the Myth of the Humanitarian 
War-Bot, DUCK MINERVA (May 14, 2014), http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2014/
05/robot-soldiers-would-never-rape-un-packing-the-myth-of-the-humanitarian-war-bot.html. 
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develop algorithms for an “ethical governor” for robots, argues that 
autonomous weapon systems could eventually comply with the law of 
armed conflict better than human soldiers.103 He believes his 
decisionmaking architecture “could potentially lead to ethically superior 
robotic warriors within as few as 10 to 20 years.”104 
Based on these and other factors, investments in unmanned 
technology are expected to grow.105 The DoD has published its annual 
“Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap,” outlining its vision for the 
“continued development, production, test[ing], training, operation, and 
sustainment of unmanned systems technology across DoD” for the next 
twenty-five years.106 This includes the goal of “[t]ak[ing] the ‘man’ out 
of unmanned [systems]”107 and moving from “autonomous mission 
execution to autonomous mission performance.”108 Believing that 
“[a]utonomy in unmanned systems will be critical to future conflicts 
that will be fought and won with technology,” the DoD has labeled 
increasing autonomy in unmanned systems a “high priority.”109 
Proponents of a ban regularly highlight states’ interest in 
developing increasingly autonomous weapon systems as a reason for 
why it is necessary to prohibit them now, and skeptics of a ban often 
suggest that states’ interest renders this a particularly productive time to 
discuss the legal constraints on the use of autonomous weapon systems. 
But in their exhortations, both sides generally ignore the fact that there 
are already a number of autonomous weapon systems in use today. 
 
3.     Autonomous Weapon Systems Today 
This subsection describes various weapon systems that would be 
classified as autonomous under the clarified definition. This list is not 
intended to be all-inclusive, but rather to provide pertinent examples of 
 
 103 ARKIN, supra note 100, at 30. 
 104 Don Troop, Robots at War: Scholars Debate the Ethical Issues, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(Sept. 10, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Moral-Robots-the-Future-of/134240. But see 
Sharkey, supra note 4, at 792–96 (critiquing Arkin and others for employing language that 
encourages the anthropomorphism of robotic processes by inappropriately attributing “ethical” 
capabilities to them). 
 105 See Jack Browne, UAV Markets Robust Despite Declining Spending, DEF. ELECTRONICS (Feb. 
15, 2012), http://defenseelectronicsmag.com/electronic-countermeasures/uav-markets-robust-
despite-declining-spending. 
 106 DOD ROADMAP, supra note 35, at v; see also Thurnher, supra note 75, at 79 (“The 
expectation is that robots on the battlefield will form the bulk of detachments, such as infantry 
units that would be comprised of 150 human soldiers working alongside 2,000 robots.”). 
 107 DOD ROADMAP, supra note 35, at 25. 
 108 Id. at 66. 
 109 Id. at 67. 
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a variety of types of weaponry with the ability to independently select 
and engage targets. And this is only a smattering of the publicly 
available research and development—weapon systems in development 
or even currently in use might employ greater autonomous capabilities 
than has been revealed. 
a.     Autonomous Weapon Systems Operated in Semi-Autonomous or 
Human-Supervised Modes 
 
Many existing autonomous weapon systems are currently only 
operated in a semi-autonomous mode—much like a Roomba that is 
only used in SPOT mode. However, just as that Roomba remains an 
autonomous cleaning robot, these weapon systems are most accurately 
classified as autonomous weapon systems. 
To monitor the demilitarized zone, South Korea has allegedly 
installed SGR-A1s: stationary, armed robots which identify potential 
human targets,110 voice commands to surrender, “observe” signs of 
surrender, and react after consultation with human supervisors in 
nearby command centers.111 Although it is not clear whether or not they 
have been deployed, the Super aEgis II has also been designed for use in 
monitoring the demilitarized zone: it consists of a gun tower that can 
“find and lock on to a human-sized target in pitch darkness at a distance 
of up to 1.36 miles,” uses anything from a 12.7 mm caliber machine gun 
to a surface-to-air missile to fire, and can be mounted on the ground or 
on a moving vehicle.112 Both the SGR-A1 and Super aEgis II may be set 
to modes where they can select and engage targets with no human 
involvement or oversight.113 
Israel’s Guardium Unmanned Ground Vehicle is a boxy, car-like 
vehicle that patrols the Israel/Gaza border. It can be operated remotely 
or programmed to act autonomously, “both driving itself and 
 
 110 The SGR-A1 identifies every human being who enters the demilitarized zone as an enemy, 
on the grounds that the individual has entered a prohibited zone. Samsung Techwin SGR-A1 
Sentry Guard Robot, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/
sgr-a1.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). These robots are reportedly assisted by technology based 
on Microsoft’s Kinect—originally developed for use with the Xbox 360. See Brian Ashcraft, 




 111 See Jon Rabiroff, Machine Gun-Toting Robots Deployed on DMZ, STARS & STRIPES (July 12, 
2010), http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/korea/machine-gun-toting-robots-deployed-on-
dmz-1.110809; Samsung Techwin SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robot, supra note 110. 
 112 Loz Blain, South Korea’s Autonomous Robot Gun Turrets: Deadly from Kilometers Away, 
GIZMAG (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.gizmag.com/korea-dodamm-super-aegis-autonomos-robot-
gun-turret/17198. 
 113 Id.; Samsung Techwin SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robot, supra note 110. 
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responding to obstacles and events,”114 and can conduct surveillance 
and use non-lethal or lethal force.115 While the Guardium appears to be 
employed in a semi-autonomous mode, it may also be able to select and 
engage targets autonomously.116 
Lastly, as noted above, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis control system, used 
to identify and eliminate incoming ballistic threats, has four modes. 
When in “casualty” mode, the human operators are assumed to be 
incapacitated and the system is able to use defensive force 
independently.117 Various generations of the CIWS/Aegis systems are 
now used in the navies of twenty-three U.S.-allied nations.118 Nor are 
U.S. allies the only ones with this technology: Russia’s AK-630, the 
Netherlands’ Goalkeeper, and Italy’s DARDO are similar weapon 
systems.119 Germany also employs the NBS MANTIS, a land-based, 
“fully automated air defence system” that will “detect, track and shoot 
the projectiles within a close range of the target base.”120 
b.     Offensive Autonomous Weapon Systems 
 
Autonomous weapon systems have also been designed for offensive 
situations—and many currently existing weapon systems might be 
employed more offensively if states so desire. As Dahm has noted, “[I]t’s 
not technology that has held us back from fully autonomous military 
strikes—from a purely technical perspective, it has been possible for 
some time to conduct them.”121 
While many fire-and-forget or lock-on-after-launch missiles are 
guided by a human deployer, sometimes by radio or lasers, and are 
therefore merely semi-autonomous, numerous other ones 
independently select and engage targets. The U.K. Brimstone is touted 
as “a fully autonomous, fire-and-forget, anti-armour weapon, effective 
 
 114 Adam May, Phantom on the Fence, ISR. DEF. FORCES BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 5:24 PM), 
http://www.idf.il/1283-17082-EN/Dover.aspx. Such responsive action is “likely alerting a 
command center to the presence of something suspicious, not opening fire without notifying a 
human operator first.” John Reed, Israel’s Killer Robot Cars, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 20, 2012, 5:33 
PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/20/israels-killer-robot-cars. 
 115 Enguard! Introducing the Guardium UGV, DEF. UPDATE, http://defense-update.com/
products/g/guardium.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Marchant et al., supra note 68, at 287. 
 118 Stoner, supra note 65. 
 119 See also Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 15, at 12 (“At least 30 nations employ or have in 
development at least one system of this type . . . .”); id. app. B (describing autonomous weapon 
systems in use today). 
 120 NBS MANTIS Air Defence Protection System, Germany, ARMY-TECHNOLOGY.COM, 
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/mantis (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 121 Dahm, supra note 82. 
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against all known and projected armoured threats.”122 When in search 
mode, “Brimstone’s mmW seeker searches for targets in its path, 
comparing them to a known target signature in its memory. The missile 
automatically rejects returns which do not match . . . and continues 
searching and comparing until it identifies a valid target.”123 It is unclear 
whether the operator programs the Brimstone to seek out a specific 
radar target or ones with certain characteristics; to the extent the latter is 
true, the Brimstone would be an autonomous weapon system. 
The Israeli Harpy Loitering Weapon “detects, attacks and destroys 
enemy radar emitters.”124 Unlike a semi-autonomous weapon, “[t]he 
person launching the Harpy does not know[] which particular radars 
are to be engaged, only that radars that meet the Harpy’s programmed 
parameters will be engaged.”125 Nor is Israel the only country with the 
Harpy: it has been sold to Turkey, South Korea, India, and China.126 
The United States is funding research in related technology: in late 
2012 the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory awarded Boeing Phantom 
Works a $10 million contract for the Dominator, a long-endurance 
UAV which will be able to autonomously conduct intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions and would potentially have 
strike capabilities.127 It is intended to carry Textron Common Smart 
Submunitions, warheads which can independently search for and 
engage targets in a two-acre area after deployment.128 
There are also sea-based autonomous weapon systems. Unlike 
other types of mines, which usually detonate automatically, 
encapsulated torpedo mines “are a type of sea mine that, when activated 
by a passing ship, instead of exploding, open a capsule which then 
releases a torpedo that engages a target.”129 The eventual target of the 
torpedo is entirely unknown by the human deployer; instead, “the mine 
is selecting and engaging targets on its own.”130 Russia and China are 
both employing the PMK-2 encapsulated torpedo mine today.131 
 
 122 ROYAL AIR FORCE, AIRCRAFT & WEAPONS 87 (Brian Handy ed., 2007) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/0186cc2a_1143_ec82_2ef2bffff37857da.pdf. 
 123 Id. There are numerous other missiles with similar autonomous target-selection 
capabilities. See MARSH, supra note 50, at 3. 
 124 Harpy Loitering Weapon, ISR. AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES, http://www.iai.co.il/2013/16143-
16153-en/IAI.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 125 Scharre, Autonomy I, supra note 41. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Bill Carey, Boeing Phantom Works Develops ‘Dominator’ UAV, AIN ONLINE (Nov. 2, 2012, 
10:30 AM), http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-11-02/
boeing-phantom-works-develops-dominator-uav. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Scharre, Autonomy I, supra note 41. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
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Last but not least, there are autonomous ground units. In addition 
to the aforementioned Israeli Guardium, Russia has recently unveiled 
Platform-M, a “universal combat platform.”132 It is a multipurpose 
weapon system, designed “for gathering intelligence, for discovering and 
eliminating stationary and mobile targets, for firepower support, for 
patrolling and for guarding important sites.”133 Its “weapons can be 
guided, it can carry out supportive tasks and it can destroy targets in 
automatic or semiautomatic control systems”134—which presumably 
means, under the clarified definition, it can operate in autonomous or 
semi-autonomous modes. 
 
* * * 
 
This Part proposed a clarified definition for autonomy in weapon 
systems, which focuses on a weapon system’s capability for 
independently selecting and engaging targets based on conclusions it 
draws from gathered information and preprogrammed constraints. 
With this new definition it quickly becomes clear that, contrary to the 
general consensus, autonomous weapon systems are not weapons of the 
future: they exist and are in use today. This fact has profound 
implications for the debate on banning such weaponry. The crucial 
question is not whether we should ban some imagined Terminator or 
Hal, but rather how we can best use law to regulate weapons with a 
proven track record. 
II.     ARE AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS INHERENTLY UNLAWFUL? 
Proponents of a ban make a number of important moral, political, 
and strategic arguments, but their primary legal claim is that 
autonomous weapon systems would never be able to comply with the 
law of armed conflict. More specifically, they argue that autonomous 
weapon systems will be unable to distinguish between lawful and 
unlawful targets; will be unable to conduct in bello proportionality 
assessments; and may not accord with the Martens Clause, which, they 
argue, requires new technology to comply “the principles of humanity” 
and “the dictates of the public conscience.” Some question whether 
states will be able to hold individuals accountable for war crimes 
committed by autonomous weapon systems; still others posit that, as a 
 
 132 Andrew Tarantola, Russia’s Military Is Getting Killer Wall-E Robot Soldiers in 2018, 
GIZMODO (July 15, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://gizmodo.com/russias-military-is-getting-killer-wall-
e-robot-soldier-1604674629. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
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matter of law, the decision to kill another human being can never be 
delegated to a machine. 
Skeptics of a ban tend to respond to these arguments on their own 
terms, highlighting controversial or inaccurate interpretations or 
arguing that the law of armed conflict is sufficiently flexible to address 
new issues.135 Skeptics also often dispute advocates’ pessimistic 
conclusions about autonomous weapon systems’ future capabilities.136 
Both sides of the debate take a fundamental, inaccurate 
assumption—that autonomous weapon systems are not in use today—as 
true. But given that such weaponry has already been integrated into 
states’ militaries with little critique, many ban advocates’ legal 
arguments lose their force. Autonomous weapon systems are currently 
being lawfully employed, demonstrating that this class of weaponry is 
not inherently unlawful. 
A.     Compliance with the Distinction Requirement 
One of the most fundamental rules in the law of armed conflict is 
that of distinction.137 Parties to a conflict must distinguish between 
lawful targets—combatants, military objectives, and civilians directly 
participating in hostilities—and unlawful targets—civilians, civilian 
objects, and persons hors de combat.138 Accordingly, parties are 
prohibited from using inherently indiscriminate weapons, which are 
usually defined either as weapons that cannot be directed at lawful 
targets or as weapons whose effects cannot be controlled. Additionally, 
any given attack in an armed conflict cannot be indiscriminate: it must 
be directed at a lawful target and cannot utilize indiscriminate weapons 
or methods of warfare. 
At present, most agree that autonomous weapon systems are 
incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians. Doing so 
requires a complicated assessment of various factors, and there are 
many gray zones that bewilder even well-trained human soldiers. For 
example, civilians taking direct part in hostilities are lawful targets, but 
armed civilians acting as law enforcement are not. Robotic systems may 
 
 135 See, e.g., Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 2, at 233. 
 136 See, e.g., id. at 234. 
 137 This customary rule is codified in multiple treaties, but most notably in Article 48 of the 
First Additional Protocol. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 48, 
adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Additional Protocol]. 
 138 An individual is hors de combat if he “is in the power of an adverse Party”; “clearly 
expresses an intention to surrender”; or “has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise 
incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself” so long as 
the individual “abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.” Id. art. 41(2). 
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be better than humans at certain tasks, but they are notoriously inept at 
recognizing objects, let alone distinguishing between lawful and 
unlawful targets.139 Presumably, autonomous weapon systems will be 
deemed to be compliant with the distinction requirement whenever 
their determinations regarding who or what is a lawful target are 
comparable to non-autonomous systems. But whether autonomous 
weapon systems will ever be able to make such distinctions is currently a 
matter of hypothetical debate: Arkin thinks robots may be able to 
comply with the distinction requirement in as few as ten years;140 
Sharkey is skeptical that they ever will be able to do so, let alone do so in 
the near future.141 
But this does not mean, as many pro-ban advocates conclude, that 
autonomous weapon systems are per se unlawful.142 First, certain 
autonomous weapon systems might be used in compliance with the 
distinction requirement based on what they are capable of targeting. 
The Israeli Harpy, for example, only “sees” and thus only targets radars. 
Second, as Michael Schmitt points out, a weapon’s inability to 
distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets simply limits where and 
when such weaponry may be lawfully deployed. He observes: 
Not every battlespace contains civilians or civilian objects. When 
they do not, a system devoid of any capacity to distinguish protected 
persons and objects from lawful military targets can be used without 
endangering the former. . . . The inability of the weapon systems to 
distinguish bears on the legality of their use in particular 
circumstances . . . , but not their lawfulness per se.143 
Therefore, “[a]n autonomous weapon system only violates the 
prohibition against weapons incapable of being directed at a lawful 
target if there are no circumstances, given its intended use, in which it 
can be used discriminately.”144 Schmitt notes the Iraqi use of SCUD 
missiles against troops in the civilian-free Iraqi desert during the 1990–
1991 Gulf War as an example of indiscriminating weapons that were 
nonetheless used discriminately (and therefore lawfully).145 
The SCUD example helps clarify Schmitt’s point, but his 
argument—that autonomous weapons can be used in a discriminating 
 
 139 See Noel E. Sharkey, Towards a Principle for the Human Supervisory Control of Robot 
Weapons, 2014 POLITICA & SOCIETÀ 305 (2014) (comparing relative strengths and weaknesses of 
human beings and autonomous systems). 
 140 Troop, supra note 104. 
 141 See Sharkey, supra note 4, at 788–89; see also ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 5; 
The Scientists’ Call . . . to Ban Autonomous Lethal Robots, ICRAC, http://icrac.net/call (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2015). 
 142 See, e.g., LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 30. 
 143 Schmitt, supra note 80, at 11. 
 144 Id. at 13. 
 145 Id. at 10. 
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fashion, notwithstanding their inability to discriminate between 
combatants and civilians—could have been even stronger had he 
discussed certain weaponry now being so used. The Korean SGR-A1, for 
example, is an autonomous weapon system being lawfully used in a 
semi-autonomous mode to patrol the demilitarized zone. Given the 
unique characteristics of the zone, where all human beings in certain 
areas can be presumed to be combatants or civilians directly 
participating in hostilities, the SGR-A1 might even be lawfully employed 
in its autonomous mode.146 
 In response, ban advocates fall back to policy reasons for banning 
autonomous weapon systems, arguing that “[n]arrowly constructed 
hypothetical cases in which fully autonomous weapons could lawfully be 
used should not be employed to legitimize the weapons or stand in the 
way of a ban because the cases do not alter the underlying concerns 
about the use of such weapons.”147 As a practical matter, it may be 
difficult to restrict the use of autonomous weapon systems to areas with 
few civilians, like the Korean demilitarized zone.148 But this is a policy 
response to a legal argument, and such cases are far from “hypothetical.” 
A better legal argument for the per se unlawfulness of autonomous 
weapon systems would focus not on whether they could distinguish 
between combatants and civilians, but instead on whether they could 
distinguish between active and wounded combatants. The former are 
lawful targets, the latter are not, and both are likely to be found in areas 
of active hostilities.  
While stronger, this argument is only relevant to anti-personnel 
autonomous weapon systems—not autonomous weapon systems 
generally. The CIWS, for example, targets only missiles and incoming 
planes (which can fairly be presumed to be piloted by hale combatants), 
and thus sidesteps this issue entirely.149 In short, given that some 
 
 146 See Jeffrey S. Thurnher, The Law That Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 ASIL 
INSIGHTS (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/4/law-applies-
autonomous-weapon-systems (“There may be situations in which an autonomous weapon system 
could satisfy this rule with a considerably low level ability to distinguish between civilian and 
military targets. Examples would include during high intensity conflicts against declared hostile 
forces or in battles that occur in remote regions, such as underwater, deserts, or areas like the 
Demilitarized Zone in Korea.”). 
 147 ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 8. 
 148 See id. at 9. 
 149 In a recent paper, Eliav Lieblich and Eyal Benvenisti imaginatively question whether 
autonomous weapon systems will impermissibly limit the opportunity for combatants to 
surrender and violate the prohibition on ordering that no quarter be given. Eliav Lieblich & Eyal 
Benvenisti, The Obligation to Exercise Discretion in Warfare: Why Autonomous Weapon Systems 
Are Unlawful 35–39 (Oct. 2014) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2479808. As they acknowledge, there is currently no requirement under 
the law of armed conflict to grant enemy combatants an opportunity to surrender. Id. at 35–36. 
However, even if such a requirement existed, as with the discretion argument, this concern is only 
relevant to anti-personnel autonomous weapon systems. 
CROOTOF.36.5.5 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:28 PM 
1876 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1837 
 
autonomous weapon systems are capable of being used discriminately 
and with controllable effects, they are not as a class per se unlawfully 
indiscriminate. 
B.     Compliance with the in Bello Proportionality Requirement 
A second foundational customary requirement of the law of armed 
conflict is that of in bello proportionality.150 As articulated in the First 
Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
proportionality requirement prohibits as indiscriminate “[a]n attack 
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”151 
The commander who authorizes an attack is responsible for 
making the proportionality analysis.152 Given the difficulty human 
beings have in making the proportionality analysis, given its inherent 
subjective and contextual elements,153 military commanders enjoy a 
great deal of discretion in subsequent evaluations of their decisions. 
When assessing whether a military action has met the proportionality 
standard, evaluators focus on the knowledge available to the 
commander at the time of the strike, and the “Rendulic Rule” suggests 
that a “reasonable commander” standard be applied when determining 
liability.154 
Ban advocates argue that autonomous weapon systems will likely 
never be able to qualitatively analyze, let alone weigh, the expected 
military advantage of a particular attack and the associated potential 
 
 150 Jus ad bellum is the law governing the commencement of hostilities; jus in bello is the law 
governing the conduct of hostilities. There are separate ad bellum and in bello proportionality 
requirements, but disputes regarding the ability of autonomous weapon systems to be used in 
compliance with the proportionality requirement generally focus on the in bello rule, which 
requires a proportionality analysis for each individual attack in an armed conflict. 
 151 First Additional Protocol, supra note 137, art. 51(5)(b). 
 152 Schmitt, supra note 80, at 20. 
 153 See John Fabian Witt, Two Conceptions of Suffering in War, in KNOWING THE SUFFERING 
OF OTHERS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON PAIN AND ITS MEANINGS 129, 147–50 (Austin Sarat ed., 
2014) (noting the difficulty of assigning military objectives and human suffering objective values, 
particularly given the relevance of the context within which the engagement occurs). 
 154 See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (“In determining whether an attack was 
proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the 
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to 
him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.”); see also 
Eric Talbot Jensen, Essay, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-on Effects: A Different Standard 
for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145, 1181–83 (2003) (discussing the 
history of the Rendulic Rule). 
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harm to civilians155—particularly insofar as the proportionality analysis 
requires “distinctively human judgement.”156 Nor, they argue, can 
responsibility for making the proportionality analysis rest with the 
human deployer, as the proportionality analysis might change between 
deployment and execution.157 
In response, ban skeptics suggest that parameters for making in 
bello proportionality analyses could “in theory” be preprogrammed into 
autonomous weapon systems, allowing them to make basic, 
conservative proportionality assessments and contact a human operator 
in more complex situations.158 The U.S. military already employs a 
“collateral damage estimate methodology,” a procedure “for 
determining the likelihood of collateral damage to objects or persons 
near a target,” the result of which in turn determines who on the chain 
of command must authorize an attack causing collateral damage.159 
Presumably, an autonomous weapon system might be preprogrammed 
to be able to select and engage targets when there is little to no chance of 
collateral damage, but be required to seek out human approval for 
attacks with a higher likelihood of collateral damage.160 
The fact that autonomous weapon systems are already being used 
with little critique, however, suggests that they can be operated in 
compliance with the proportionality requirement.161 But, just like the 
proportionality analysis itself, when an autonomous weapon system can 
be so employed is fact-dependent and context-specific. 
One lawful possibility involves the use of autonomous weapon 
systems in semi-autonomous modes. A commander might determine 
that a specific attack complies with the proportionality requirement and 
authorizes an autonomous weapon system, operating in a semi-
autonomous mode, to engage a given target. This is how some 
autonomous weapon systems, like the Israeli Guardium and Korean 
SGR-A1, are reportedly used today. In these situations, the autonomous 
weapon system is being used lawfully, notwithstanding its inability to 
make its own proportionality determination. 
 
 155 ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 6. 
 156 Heyns Report, supra note 5, at 14. 
 157 ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 6–7. 
 158 Schmitt, supra note 80, at 20–21. 
 159 Id. at 19. 
 160 See John S. Canning, You’ve Just Been Disarmed. Have a Nice Day!, 28 IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y 
MAG. 13, 13–15 (2009) (recommending that autonomous weapon systems primarily target 
weapons, rather than their wielders, and proposing a “dial-a-level” of autonomy when it is 
necessary to target human beings). 
 161 See Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal “Singularity”?, 2013 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 45, 62 (2013) (concluding that, in certain situations, autonomous weapon 
systems may be able to be lawfully used notwithstanding their inability to conduct proportionality 
analyses). 
CROOTOF.36.5.5 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:28 PM 
1878 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1837 
 
Another lawful possibility would occur when a commander 
determines that a variety of potential engagements in a given battlespace 
and limited temporal span would comply with the proportionality 
requirement and authorizes an autonomous weapon system to select 
and engage targets within those preprogrammed constraints. Certain 
fire-and-forget or lock-on-after-launch weapon systems like the Israeli 
Harpy or U.K. Brimstone are employed in this manner: although they 
are autonomously selecting and engaging targets, the limited temporal 
span between their deployment and potential engagements permits a 
commander to take responsibility for the proportionality analysis—
provided, of course, that the commander takes what may occur during 
the time between deployment and engagement into account.162 To do 
so, of course, the commander must be trained in the weapon system’s 
capabilities, limitations, and destructive potential. 
The most difficult question is whether autonomous weapon 
systems, operating on extended missions or in unforeseen 
environments, could be adequately preprogrammed to comply with the 
proportionality requirement. At present, there are no autonomous 
weapon systems able to engage in such long-range missions, but states 
are investing in the development of weapon systems with such 
capabilities. The Energetically Autonomous Tactical Robot (EATR) 
project, for example, is developing an autonomous robotic platform that 
could forage for plant biomass to refuel itself over long-range, long-
endurance missions, allowing for an attenuated relationship between the 
deployment of a ground system and its actions (and, incidentally, 
leading to one of the more entertaining press releases of all time).163 
Where there is a significant temporal span between deployment 
and potential engagements or where the weapon system is venturing 
into unknown territory, a commander could not reasonably take 
responsibility for conducting the proportionality requirement; too many 
of the conditions the weapon system might face would be 
unpredictable.164 At some point in the future, it may be possible to 
preprogram autonomous weapon systems with sufficient constraints to 
satisfy the proportionality analysis requirement—and perhaps even 
 
 162 Cf. O’Connell, supra note 4, at 234 (arguing that a new norm of international law, requiring 
a close temporal distance between force deployment and target engagement, is necessary to “keep 
a human conscience” in the decision). 
 163 See Press Release, Cyclone Power Techs., Cyclone Power Technologies Responds to 
Rumors About “Flesh Eating” Military Robot (July 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.robotictechnologyinc.com/images/upload/file/Cyclone%20Power%20Press%20
Release%20EATR%20Rumors%20Final%2016%20July%2009.pdf (insisting that the robot would 
be “strictly vegetarian” in response to “the public’s concern about futuristic robots feeding on the 
human population”). 
 164 See ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 6–7. 
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permit more precise analyses than human beings currently make.165 
However, given their current inability to discriminate between lawful 
and unlawful targets and their inability to weigh the military advantage 
of a particular engagement against anticipatable harm to unlawful 
targets, at present autonomous weapon systems cannot now be lawfully 
deployed on extended missions or in unknown environments. 
Autonomous weapon systems are already employed in various 
ways and in compliance with the in bello proportionality requirement. 
The fact that they cannot be so used in other circumstances is not a legal 
argument for a complete ban on such weaponry; rather, it is in 
argument in favor of regulation illuminating when and how 
autonomous weapon systems can be lawfully used. 
C.     The Inapplicability of the Martens Clause 
The Martens Clause appears in the first article of the First 
Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It provides: “In 
cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of 
the principles of international law derived from established custom, 
from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of the public 
conscience.”166 
The Martens Clause has been described by the International Court 
of Justice as customary international law, binding on all states, and as 
“an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military 
technology.”167 But how it is to be understood and applied is still hotly 
debated. Interpreted narrowly, the Martens Clause implies that, in the 
absence of positive treaty law, customary international law, the 
principles of humanity, and public conscience should guide states’ 
actions.168 Given a broader reading, the Martens Clause elevates 
compliance with “the principles of humanity” and “the dictates of the 
public conscience” to additional, independent legal requirements.169 
Some ban advocates suggest that, given the lack of international 
law explicitly regulating autonomous weapon systems, the Martens 
 
 165 Schmitt, supra note 80, at 20–21. The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, for example, is 
currently testing a Cognitive Robot Abstract Machine, which is supposed to be able to process 
new information and make decisions faster and better than human beings. It can classify and 
identify objects, run algorithms to test various action-based scenarios, and ultimately adopt the 
“best” scenario. See Hauptman, supra note 76, at 185. 
 166 First Additional Protocol, supra note 137, art. 1(2). 
 167 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 
(July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. 
 168 See Tyler D. Evans, Note, At War with the Robots: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the 
Martens Clause, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 713–19 (2013). 
 169 See id. at 713–14, 716 (discussing the current debate over the scope of the Martens Clause). 
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Clause is relevant.170 Favoring the broad reading, they conclude that 
autonomous weapon systems are only lawful under the Clause if they do 
not violate “the principles of humanity” and “the dictates of the public 
conscience.”171 They then question whether autonomous weapon 
systems meet these standards, noting that robotic systems do not 
experience compassion—which the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) has stated is vital to the principle of humanity—and citing 
Charli Carpenter’s 2013 study finding that, of those with an opinion, 
sixty-eight percent of surveyed Americans oppose the use of fully 
autonomous weapon systems.172 
Skeptics of a ban, employing a narrowed reading, respond that the 
Martens Clause is not “an overarching principle that must be considered 
in every case,” but rather is “a failsafe mechanism meant to address 
lacunae in the law.”173 Even assuming for the sake of argument that the 
broad reading is the best reading, some question whether there is 
sufficient public consensus to ban autonomous weapon systems under 
the Martens Clause.174 
Arguments for a ban based on the Martens Clause are not very 
strong, standing alone, not least because the Clause is usually employed 
to supplement other legal reasoning.175 Additionally, the commonly 
cited empirical evidence of public concern regarding autonomous 
weapon systems (Carpenter’s 2013 survey) was based on a definition of 
autonomy for weapon systems that could be understood as implying 
that they operated without any restraint. Participants were asked how 
they felt about “the trend toward using completely autonomous [robotic 
weapons/lethal robots] in war,” which were described as “robotic 
weapons that can independently make targeting and firing decisions 
without a human in the loop.”176 Unsurprisingly, most opposed using 
weapons which had no clear restrictive mechanisms;177 it remains 
unknown what percentage of participants would oppose the use of 
weapons that “can independently make targeting and firing decisions” 
but are subject to preprogrammed constraints. 
Furthermore, the existence and use of autonomous weapon 
systems further weakens the persuasive power of legal arguments 
 
 170 ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 15. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 2, at 275. 
 174 Evans, supra note 168, at 727–28 (noting that even the authors of Losing Humanity concede 
that there is currently no consensus regarding whether autonomous weapon systems would 
violate these principles). 
 175 See id. at 717–18. 
 176 Carpenter, supra note 82, at 1 (the wording was varied to measure the extent the term used 
affected public sentiment). 
 177 Id. 
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grounded in the Martens Clause. First, there is some question as to 
whether the Clause is even applicable, as autonomous weapon systems 
are governed by both the law of armed conflict and many other treaty 
and customary international legal regimes.178 Second, autonomous 
weapon systems in use today have not drawn criticism on the grounds 
that they violate the “principles of humanity” and the “dictates of the 
public conscience.” 
D.     Extraneous Accountability Issues 
Who is to be held accountable when an autonomous weapon 
system violates the law of armed conflict? Its operator? Its operator’s 
commander? Its programmer—or, more complicating, its team of 
programmers? Its manufacturer? The autonomous weapon system 
itself? Many have concluded that none of these possibilities are 
satisfactory or fair,179 and some suggest that this provides an additional 
reason why autonomous weapon systems would be unlawful.180 
But while the issue of accountability raises fascinating moral, 
philosophical, policy, and even domestic and international legal 
questions, it does not bolster arguments that autonomous weapon 
systems are inherently unlawful. Whether a weapon is per se unlawful is 
not, and has never been, based on whether an individual can be held 
accountable for violations following from its use.181 
 
 178 See Rebecca Crootof, The Varied Law of Autonomous Weapon Systems, in NATO ALLIED 
COMMAND TRANSFORMATION, AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS: ISSUES FOR DEFENCE POLICY MAKERS 
(Andrew P. Williams & Paul D. Scharre eds.) (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2569322 (describing other legal regimes—
including international human rights law, the law of the sea, the law of outer space, and the law 
regarding state responsibility for private actors—that provide guidance on the lawful usage of 
autonomous weapon systems). 
 179 See, e.g., Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62 (2007). Of course, legal 
regimes regularly make liability determinations that may seem “unfair” from a philosophical 
standpoint, usually for various policy reasons—as evidenced by any domestic strict liability 
regime. Compare id. (concluding that, because no one can ethically be assigned liability for the 
actions of an autonomous system, they cannot be used), with Kastan, supra note 161, at 69 
(“[G]eneral philosophical objections to applying accountability either to the humans directing 
[autonomous weapon systems] or to the systems themselves stand in opposition to long-standing 
principles of legal accountability.”). 
 180 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 4, at 236 (concluding that the use of autonomous weapon 
systems “would conflict with the historical, legal, and moral understanding that killing should be 
based on a good-faith understanding of real necessity and carried out by someone who may be 
held accountable for a wrong decision”); Lawand, supra note 8 (“If responsibility cannot be 
determined as required by [international humanitarian law], is it legal or ethical to deploy such 
systems?”). 
 181 Rather, weapons are only per se unlawful if they cannot be used discriminately, if they 
cause superfluous injury, or if they are specifically banned (usually by treaty). See infra Part 
III.B.1–2. 
CROOTOF.36.5.5 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:28 PM 
1882 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1837 
 
Furthermore, autonomous weapon systems in use today have 
arguably contributed to breaches of the law of armed conflict; that has 
not prevented states from continuing to use them. The Aegis system, for 
example, may have played a part in the Flight 655 tragedy.182 But it is 
still employed by Australia, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Spain, and the 
United States, and many other countries use other, similar systems. 
Significantly, neither states, scholars, nor the most vocal critics of 
autonomous weapon systems have argued that these ongoing uses are 
per se unlawful. 
Constructing a liability regime may require a more carefully 
calibrated definition for autonomous weapon systems than the one 
suggested by this Article. To best assign liability, it will be important to 
consider the finer distinctions between an Aegis system, operated in its 
semi-autonomous mode, and a Terminator-like system that enjoys 
near-full autonomy. Determining how best to assign individual liability 
for different types of violations will be a regulatory headache—and a 
project for a different paper.183 For this Article, it is sufficient to note 
that while accountability questions undoubtedly pose a challenge, it is 
neither an insurmountable one nor a strong legal argument for a ban. 
E.     The Nonexistent Nondelegation Principle 
Asaro suggests that there is a principle in the law of armed conflict 
that “the authority to decide to initiate the use of lethal force cannot be 
legitimately delegated to an automated process, but must remain the 
responsibility of a human with the duty to make a considered and 
informed decision before taking human lives.”184 Asaro explicitly casts 
his argument as a legal one, suggesting that this norm is on par with the 
requirement that all attacks are discriminating and proportional.185 
However, Asaro’s claim is actually a moral one—or, at best, an 
argument for the creation of a new legal norm. As a matter of 
international law, there is no treaty provision requiring that a human 
 
 182 See Singer, supra note 89, at 40. 
 183 Many have begun outlining the issues involved in constructing liability regimes. See, e.g., 
Tim McFarland & Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous Weapons 
Systems Be Liable for War Crimes?, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 361 (2014); Thilo Marauhn, Professor, Justus 
Liebig Univ., Presentation at the CCW Expert Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Systems: An 
Analysis of the Potential Impact of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems on Responsibility and 
Accountability for Violations of International Law (May 13–16, 2014), available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/35FEA015C2466A57C1257CE400
4BCA51/$file/Marauhn_MX_Laws_SpeakingNotes_2014.pdf; see also Kastan, supra note 161, at 
65–81 (discussing U.S. domestic issues related to assigning liability for the actions of autonomous 
weapon systems). 
 184 Asaro, supra note 4, at 689. 
 185 Id. at 687–88. 
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being make “a considered and informed decision” before taking another 
human life, and to the extent there is evidence of a customary norm, it 
points the other direction. Many automated weapons now in use fail to 
accord with this principle, but they are rarely critiqued on that basis. 
Although he acknowledges this fact, Asaro never grapples with the blow 
the current, accepted use of many automated weapons deals to his 
theory—much less the current, accepted use of autonomous weapon 
systems.186 
 
* * * 
 
The legal arguments made by pro-ban advocates rest on the 
assumption that autonomous weapon systems do not yet exist—and ban 
skeptics who respond to these claims tend to take the same assumption 
for granted. But autonomous weapon systems are currently being 
lawfully used, demonstrating that this class of weaponry is not 
inherently unlawful. 
Acknowledging this fact fundamentally alters the terms and stakes 
of the debate. First, proponents of a ban might do well to acknowledge 
that their strongest arguments for a ban are moral, policy, or strategic 
ones. Second, rather than debating the inherent lawfulness of 
autonomous weapon systems, those interested in using legal means to 
limit the use and development of such weaponry—whose number 
includes both advocates and skeptics of a ban—could more productively 
spend their time discussing how best to regulate weapon systems now in 
use. 
III.     CAN AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS BE SUCCESSFULLY BANNED? 
Human beings are remarkably ingenious at developing new means 
and methods of killing each other. Throughout history, new weapons 
have been critiqued for being too ignoble, gruesome, or haphazard—but 
only some of these weapons have been successfully banned. 
Scholars on both sides of the ban debate have mined historical 
examples for evidence that states will or will not be able to successfully 
ban autonomous weapon systems. Proponents of a ban point to widely-
adhered-to prohibitions on chemical weapons and permanently 
blinding lasers.187 Skeptics, noting failed attempts to ban crossbows and 
 
 186 See id. at 694. 
 187 See, e.g., ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 24; Memorandum from the Mines 
Action Can. to Convention on Conventional Weapons Delegates (May 2014) [hereinafter Mines 
Action Can. Memorandum], available at https://bankillerrobotscanada.files.wordpress.com/2014/
05/international-piv-memo-final.pdf. 
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aerial bombardment, respond that weapon bans are generally 
ineffective.188 But there is little analysis of which of these historical 
examples is most aptly analogized to autonomous weapon systems. To 
the extent scholars do discuss similarities and distinctions between 
earlier banned weaponry and autonomous weapon systems, they tend to 
ignore the crucial fact that these weapons are already integrated into 
states’ armed forces. 
Based on commonly cited attempted and enacted weapon bans,189 
this Part teases out eight traits which seem to increase the likelihood 
that a given ban will be successful—which is to say, both enacted and 
effective at limiting the usage of the banned weapon. Based on these 
characteristics, it concludes that states are unlikely to negotiate a 
successful ban on autonomous weapon systems. 
A.     Qualities of a Successful Ban 
Every weapon ban success story is the product of a unique 
combination of factors, including the weapon’s inherent traits, its recent 
usage, prevailing moral and ethical concerns, and the status and 
interests of concerned states. It is tempting—and not inaccurate—to 
conclude that each ban is sui generis, the product of hard work and 
happy coincidence. 
That being said, successful bans do seem to have certain qualities in 
common, and failed attempts to ban a class of weapon share a number 
of contrary characteristics. At the risk of oversimplifying the complex 
interactions that have resulted in successful bans, this Section attempts 
to tease out some common qualities.190 
1.     Weapons Causing Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering 
The Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which banned explosive 
bullets and provided incentive for the eventual banning of expanding 
bullets, proclaimed that the object of warfare “would be exceeded by the 
employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled 
men, or render their death inevitable” and that the use of such weapons 
 
 188 See, e.g., Reeves & Johnson, supra note 4. 
 189 The Appendix reviews various attempted and enacted bans on different classes of weaponry 
and types of warfare, including crossbows, aerial bombardment, submarines, nuclear weapons, 
cluster munitions, anti-personnel landmines, biological weapons, chemical weapons, and 
permanently blinding lasers. 
 190 This list is not intended to be exhaustive, nor does it discuss the likely relative weight of the 
different factors.  
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would therefore “be contrary to the laws of humanity.”191 This 
prohibition has since evolved into a customary rule of armed conflict, 
reiterated in numerous treaties.192 Technically, because their use is 
already forbidden, there should be no need to explicitly ban weapons 
causing superfluous injuries—they are already per se unlawful. 
In practice, states naturally disagree about which weapons qualify 
as per se unlawful on these grounds, and advocates of nearly all modern 
attempted and enacted bans have argued that the weapon in question 
causes superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Accordingly, while 
claims that specific weapons cause superfluous injuries have 
undergirded weapon bans since the 1868 Declaration, an argument that 
a given weapon is per se unlawful on this ground does not significantly 
increase the likelihood of a ban being concluded or of its ultimate 
effectiveness.  
That being said, if injuries caused by a weapon inspire widespread 
public concern and civil society engagement, they may indirectly 
contribute to the likelihood of a ban’s success.193 Additionally, a ban 
might clarify whether or not there is consensus as to whether the use of 
a given weapon generally causes superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering. 
2.     Inherently Indiscriminate Weapons 
Because indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, inherently 
indiscriminate weapons—which includes weapons that cannot be 
directed at a military objective and weapons whose effects cannot be 
controlled—are per se unlawful. This is both a practical and 
humanitarian prohibition: to the extent a weapon’s effects cannot be 
directed or controlled, it threatens both the users’ troops and nearby 
civilians. 
Ban advocates regularly argue that the weapon in question is 
inherently indiscriminate. But, like weapons causing superfluous 
injuries, states can disagree in good faith on this question. For example, 
many advocates of the Mine Ban Convention argue that anti-personnel 
landmines are per se unlawfully indiscriminate;194 the United States has 
responded that “smart” mines, which could destruct or deactivate 
 
 191 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles, Nov. 
29–Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S. 297. 
 192 Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering, INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule70 (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2015). 
 193 See infra Part III.B.7. 
 194 See, e.g., Why the Ban, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/
problem/why-the-ban.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
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automatically after a certain period of time or at the end of active 
hostilities, would not be.195 Nor will near-universal recognition that a 
weapon is inherently indiscriminate ensure that states will be able to 
conclude a treaty ban, as evidenced by nuclear weapons. 
It is worth noting that, just by existing, a ban may contribute to its 
own effectiveness. In situations where a weapon is not universally 
recognized as indiscriminate at the time a ban is concluded, the passage 
of the ban itself may lead to the recognition of the weapon’s 
indiscriminate nature. The Mine Ban Convention is largely credited 
with the increasing stigmatization of anti-personnel landmines,196 and 
advocates of the Convention on Cluster Munitions hope that it will have 
a similar effect.197 Similarly, states’ military manuals now tend to 
describe biological weapons as prohibited because they are 
indiscriminate—not because their use is forbidden by treaty law.198 
3.     Ineffective Weapons 
Discussing the Hague Conference’s bans of various forms of 
weaponry, one scholar reflected: 
Such destructive weapons, for instance, as the high explosive shell, 
the shrapnel, mines or torpedoes, were retained as legitimate means 
of warfare, whereas the inefficient expanding and explosive bullets 
were condemned along with the perfectly useless free balloons. The 
proceedings of the Hague Conference demonstrate rather that a 
weapon will be restricted in inverse proportion, more or less, to its 
effectiveness; that the more efficient a weapon or method of warfare 
the less likelihood there is of its being restricted in action by the rules 
of war.199 
This realist analysis has been borne out to some degree in recent 
practice: many credit the relative success of the biological and chemical 
 
 195 See Emily Alpert, Why Hasn’t the U.S. Signed an International Ban on Landmines?, L.A. 
TIMES BLOG (Apr. 5, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/04/mine-
treaty-us-ottawa-convention.html. 
 196 See, e.g., Rachel Good, Note & Comment, Yes We Should: Why the U.S. Should Change Its 
Policy Toward the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 209, 210 (2011). 
 197 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TWELVE FACTS AND FALLACIES ABOUT THE 
CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS 6 (2009) [hereinafter HRW TWELVE FACTS], available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/14/twelve-facts-and-fallacies-about-convention-cluster-
munitions. 
 198 See Practice Relating to Rule 71. Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate, INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter20_rule71 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (citing sources). 
 199 M.W. ROYSE, AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WARFARE 
131–32 (1928); see also Bonnie Docherty, The Time Is Now: A Historical Argument for a Cluster 
Munitions Convention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 59–61 (2007). 
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weapon bans with the fact that they are weapons with little military 
utility for powerful states, especially relative to newer weaponry.200 
Equally, once a weapon has demonstrated its utility, it will be 
difficult to convince states to cease using it. Most failed bans share two 
crucial characteristics in common, one of which is that they attempted 
to prohibit the use of extremely effective weapons. 
However, the conclusion that the law will always bow to effective 
weapons201—which is to say, that effective weapons can never be 
banned—is not entirely accurate. Chemical weapons have proven their 
utility in many situations, yet the chemical weapons ban is one of the 
more effective ones in existence today.202 The Mine Ban Convention is 
another possible exception to the general rule: despite its many 
arguments that anti-personnel mines have military value, the United 
States has now committed to ceasing to produce or acquire banned 
mines in the future with an eye toward compliance with the 
Convention.203 
4.     Other Means Exist for Accomplishing the Same Military Objective 
Certain weapons may efficiently accomplish a military objective: 
permanently blinding lasers, for example, can be used to disable enemy 
troops. However, when a state may use another weapon—say, 
temporarily blinding lasers—to accomplish the same military objective 
by other means, it will be more willing to relinquish the other one.204 
Again, the converse is also true: states will be less willing to 
voluntarily surrender a weapon which provides the only means of 
 
 200 See, e.g., Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 
86 CALIF. L. REV. 939, 992 n.199 (1998). The United States unilaterally renounced its biological 
weapons research after concluding they were of limited military effectiveness. See Docherty, supra 
note 199, at 60. 
 201 See Hays Parks, Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles and International Law: A Response, 
103 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 120, 120 (1977) (“In the consideration of any new weapon, 
technology must yield to the law, or the law to technological change. Where a weapon has proved 
effective, the latter usually has occurred.”). 
 202 See RICHARD M. PRICE, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABOO 5 (1997); Jozef Goldblat, The 
Biological Weapons Convention—An Overview, 318 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 251, 264 (1997) 
(describing chemical weapons as “predictable, capable of producing immediate effects and, 
consequently, useful in combat”). 
 203 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. Anti-
Personnel Landmine Policy (June 27, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/27/fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-
landmine-policy. But see Docherty, supra note 199, at 60 (arguing that the success of the Mine 
Ban Convention is due in part to the fact that anti-personnel landmines have declining military 
utility). 
 204 See MARSH, supra note 50, at 2; cf. Hauptman, supra note 76, at 192 (“Laws that focus more 
on methodology, rather than outcomes, are more likely to gain adherence because state will not 
feel as if their legitimate options for attaining military victory have been prohibited.”). 
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accomplishing certain goals. The second crucial characteristic most 
failed weapon bans have in common is that they attempted to ban 
weapons which, at least at the time, were unique in their ability to wreak 
a certain type of devastation or accomplish certain goals. 
5.     Clear and Narrowly Tailored Prohibitions 
Bans are more likely to be effective if they clearly describe what 
weapons are and are not permitted. The Chemical Weapons 
Convention, for example, has an extensive Annex on Chemicals 
delineating why and what specific agents are prohibited.205 Clear 
descriptions increase the effectiveness of a ban at three critical points in 
time. First, states want to understand precisely what capabilities they are 
foregoing at the time of treaty ratification. Second, because states know 
precisely what is forbidden, they will be less likely to use or invest 
research monies in developing related weapons. Finally, in most cases, 
other states will be able to easily identify violations of the ban.206 For 
treaty regimes with enforcement mechanisms, this will make formal 
enforcement easier; for those without, states and civil society can still 
engage in informal enforcement actions, such as naming and shaming.  
Furthermore, many bans owe their existence and success to the fact 
that they are narrowly tailored. The prohibition on blinding laser 
weapons does not prohibit the development or use of temporarily 
blinding weapons, such as dazzlers.207 Additionally, it only forbids the 
use of weapons where the primary purpose is to cause blinding—it 
explicitly does not cover blinding which occurs “as an incidental or 
collateral effect of the legitimate military employment of laser systems, 
including laser systems used against optical equipment.”208 The 
Biological Weapons Convention excepts agents that have “justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes,”209 and the Mine 
 
 205 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Annex on Chemicals, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]. 
 206 There is reason to believe, however, that this generalization will not hold true for 
autonomous weapon systems, no matter how precisely they are defined. See infra Part III.B. 
 207 See Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 105-1, 2024 U.N.T.S. 167. In 2006, the United States employed laser dazzlers in Iraq to 
temporarily incapacitate drivers who ignored warnings at checkpoints. James Rainey, A Safer 
Weapon, With Risks, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/18/world/
fg-laser18. 
 208 Protocol IV, supra note 207, art. 3. 
 209 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention]. 
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Ban Convention excludes anti-tank mines equipped with anti-handling 
devices from its definition of “anti-personnel mines.”210 
Broader, vague bans have had far less success. The 1907 Hague 
Declaration’s prohibition of “the launching of projectiles and explosives 
from balloons” may have enjoyed greater ratification rates had it not 
also banned similar launchings “by other new methods of a similar 
nature.”211 Additionally, the United States—originally one of the key 
initiators of a ban on anti-personnel landmines—may have joined the 
Mine Ban Convention had the other state parties been willing to make 
certain exceptions that restricted its application.212 
6.     Prior Regulation 
The existence of a prior treaty or customary regulation, either on 
the same form of weaponry or on a similar type or class of weapons, 
may encourage states to conclude and abide by a later, stronger treaty 
ban. The success of the chemical weapons ban has been traced to the 
prohibitions on the use of poison or poisoned weapons,213 and the 
relatively effective anti-personnel landmine ban was preceded by a 
regulatory treaty. 
If, however, new technological developments have increased the 
military utility of a weapon, the existence of a prior, related treaty will 
not be decisive. States were relatively willing to ban aerial bombardment 
by balloon; they were far less willing to ban aerial bombardment after 
the invention of the airplane. 
7.     Public Concern and Civil Society Engagement 
The existence and growing success of the Mine Ban Convention 
and the Convention on Cluster Munitions has been widely attributed to 
the active participation of nongovernmental organizations and other 
civil society representatives, both prior to, during, and after the treaty 
 
 210 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction art. 2, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter 
Mine Ban Convention] (defining an “anti-handling device” as a device “which activates when an 
attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine”). 
 211 Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, 1 Bevans 739 [hereinafter 1907 Declaration]. 
 212 See David E. Sanger, U.S., in Shift, Says It May Sign Treaty to Ban Land Mines, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/15/world/us-in-shift-says-it-may-sign-treaty-to-
ban-land-mines.html. 
 213 See PRICE, supra note 202, at 15. 
CROOTOF.36.5.5 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:28 PM 
1890 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1837 
 
negotiations.214 Harold Koh argues that these “transnational norm 
entrepreneurs” can play an important role in altering states’ interests.215 
Some have suggested that such actors will likely play an increasingly 
influential role in the future.216 
That being said, this factor is far from decisive. Despite 
longstanding crusades for a ban on nuclear weapons by a plethora of 
prominent individuals and international and domestic organizations—
including direct action organizations, environmental groups, consumer 
protection groups, professional associations, and political and religious 
organizations—a ban on nuclear weapons still seems out of reach. 
8.     Sufficient State Commitment 
All of the aforementioned characteristics will help determine 
whether a state will be willing to voluntarily renounce its right to use an 
otherwise lawful weapon. And, ultimately, states’ commitment is the 
best indicator of a weapon bans’ success: without it, no ban can be 
concluded, let alone be effective. 
But state commitment to a ban is not purely a product of, say, 
whether the weapon is uniquely effective or abhorrent to the general 
public. It may also depend on the number of other states willing to 
renounce the weapon. Thus, there may be a snowball effect: as more 
states publically declare their support for a ban, more states may be 
willing to support it. The status of supporting states is also relevant to a 
ban’s success. If a treaty ban is ratified by the vast majority of states in 
the international community, but not by states that produce or use the 
weapon in question, it would be difficult to argue that the ban is 
successful.217 Finally, a ban with a small number of initial state parties 
could potentially become effective over time, if its language evolves into 
customary international law and thereby becomes binding on all states. 
However, without widespread subscription or buy-in from the most 
relevant states, a treaty is unlikely to contribute significantly to the 
development of relevant customary norms. 
 
 214 See, e.g., Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: 
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L 191, 199–201 (2000). 
 215 Harold Hongju Koh, Address, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 
35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 656–63 (1998) (discussing the role of these norm entrepreneurs with regard 
to the Mine Ban Treaty). 
 216 See Eric Talbot Jensen, The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict: Ostriches, Butterflies, and 
Nanobots, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 253, 282 (2014). 
 217 See Reeves & Johnson, supra note 4, at 29 n.55. 
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B.     Implications for Autonomous Weapon Systems 
The prior section identified eight traits often associated with 
successful bans. Of these, only one characteristic—civil society 
engagement—suggests that a ban on autonomous weapon systems 
would be enacted or effective; the others are inconclusive or currently 
weigh against the likelihood of a successful ban. 
Acknowledging that autonomous weapon systems have already 
been integrated into states’ armed forces affects the analysis of many of 
these factors. First, there is evidence that autonomous weapon systems 
can be highly effective in certain circumstances, such as where faster-
than-human reaction times are necessary. Second, many of the 
objectives accomplished by autonomous weapon systems could not be 
similarly achieved by other means.218 Because autonomous weapon 
systems now in use are uniquely effective, it will be difficult to convince 
states to voluntarily relinquish them.219 Finally, there has not been any 
great public outcry over the current deployment of autonomous weapon 
systems. 
Two aspects of the clarity factor undermine the likelihood of a 
successful ban on autonomous weapon systems. First, because the 
possibilities for their use is far from understood, let alone exhausted, 
states are unlikely to agree to prohibit them. Second, even were a ban 
enacted, autonomous weapon systems are unusual in that it may not be 
possible to determine if and when the ban is violated. As evidenced by 
conflicting reports on the Korean SGR-A1, it is difficult for outside 
observers to determine the autonomous capabilities of any given system. 
As a result, only those deploying a weapon system will know if it is 
semi-autonomous or autonomous, supervised or unsupervised. 
 
 218 Because the ban on permanently blinding lasers does not prohibit the use of lasers generally 
or even the use of temporarily blinding lasers, it does not prevent states from accomplishing 
similar military objectives. Therefore, contrary to many assertions, this ban provides little 
precedential value for a ban of autonomous weapon systems. See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 
2, at 281 n.158; see also Hauptman, supra note 76, at 195 n.89. Contra Mines Action Can. 
Memorandum, supra note 187 (discussing the relevance of the ban on permanently blinding 
lasers); see also O’Connell, supra note 4, at 15; Q&A on Fully Autonomous Weapons, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/21/qa-fully-autonomous-weapons. 
  Additionally, while they had not yet been used in combat, the effects of blinding lasers were 
fairly predictable, see Evans, supra note 168, at 721–22, 731, and unnecessarily harmful, see 
ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 17—unlike the potential effects of as-yet-undeveloped 
autonomous weapon systems. 
 219 Cf. MARSH, supra note 50, at 4 (“At the very least, if the Brimstone and other ‘fire and 
forget’ missiles are assumed to fall under the definition used by the Campaign, then consider 
effort may need to be expended on explaining why they are not to be considered militarily 
essential.”); see also ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 18 (noting that, once autonomous 
weapon systems technology is developed, “many countries would be reluctant to give it up, 
especially if their competitors were deploying it”). 
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While states do seem interested in how autonomous weapon 
systems might be regulated,220 there is hardly sufficient state 
commitment at present to suggest a ban would be successful. At the 
May 2014 Experts Meeting, only a few states called for an outright 
ban.221 Nor is there any evidence that the military powerhouses 
currently investing in autonomous weapon research and development 
would join such a treaty. In fact, the United Kingdom opposes any such 
ban.222 
Other factors do not weigh heavily one way or the other. There is 
nothing intrinsic to autonomous weapon systems that would cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; a bullet fired by an 
autonomous sentry robot causes the same amount of injury as one fired 
by a human sentry.223 Certainly some autonomous weapon systems 
could be designed to cause such harm—just as certain bullets could be 
designed to cause excessive damage—but that does not mean the class of 
weapons as a whole should be banned. And, as discussed above, even 
assuming that autonomous weapons cannot discriminate between 
lawful and unlawful targets does not make them per se unlawfully 
indiscriminate. As evidenced by autonomous weapon systems in use 
today, they can be employed in a discriminating manner and with 
controlled effects.224 Nor is there any directly relevant prior regulation. 
The only characteristic which seems to increase the likelihood of a 
successful ban is the strong civil society campaign, comprised of a 
growing coalition of legal scholars, philosophers, human rights activists, 
scientists, Nobel laureates, and diverse organizations.225 Due to their 
efforts, “killer robots” are no longer perceived as the stuff of science 
 
 220 See Knuckey, supra note 7 (noting that, at the May 2014 Experts Meeting, all thirty states 
making opening statements welcomed the conversation, many states took an active role in 
discussions, and no state argued that it was the wrong time or forum to be addressing these 
issues—instead, some states proposed that the issue be considered additionally in other forums). 
 221 See Bonnie Docherty, Taking on “Killer Robots,” JUST SECURITY (May 23, 2014, 11:30 AM), 
http://justsecurity.org/10732/guest-post-killer-robots (reporting that five states have called for a 
ban); Knuckey, supra note 7 (stating that Ecuador, Egypt, and Pakistan called for a ban on fully 
autonomous weapon systems). 
 222 Owen Bowcott, UK Opposes International Ban on Developing ‘Killer Robots,’ THE 
GUARDIAN, Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/13/uk-opposes-
international-ban-on-developing-killer-robots. 
 223 See George R. Lucas, Jr., Automated Warfare, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 330 n.24 
(2014). Contra Mark Gubrud, The Principle of Humanity in Conflict, ICRAC (Nov. 19, 2012), 
http://icrac.net/2012/11/the-principle-of-humanity-in-conflict (suggesting that there “is a human 
right not to be killed on the decision of machines”); Wendell Wallach, Terminating the 
Terminator: What to Do About Autonomous Weapons, SCI. PROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://scienceprogress.org/2013/01/terminating-the-terminator-what-to-do-about-autonomous-
weapons (arguing that permitting machines to make life-or-death decisions is mala in se—evil in 
itself—like the use of rape or biological weaponry). 
 224 See supra Part II.A. 
 225 See ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 24. 
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fiction; rather, they are the subject of Special Rapporteur reports,226 
international meetings,227 and U.S. congressional briefings.228 These 
norm entrepreneurs are working to frame the debate on autonomous 
weapon systems to increase the likelihood of a successful ban.229 
Whether this will be sufficient, especially when balanced against the 
other factors, has yet to be seen. 
Perhaps the most critical determinant of an autonomous weapon 
system ban’s success will be how narrowly tailored the chosen definition 
is. If the official threshold for autonomy in a weapon system is set 
excessively high, it will exclude weapon systems with autonomous 
capabilities currently in use today or likely to be developed in the near 
future, which would increase the likelihood of state subscription. 
However, this would grant states wide latitude in using weapon systems 
capable of independently selecting and engaging targets, which 
undermines the original impetus for a ban.230 Additionally, as Nicolas 
Marsh points out, there is a paradoxical effect to a definition of 
autonomy that would require machines to engage in human-level 
reasoning: “A key motivation for the Campaign [to Stop Killer Robots] 
is that robots cannot make the ethical and contextual assessments that 
humans can. However, a robot with a decisionmaking capability as 
advanced as human cognition could presumably make such 
judgments.”231 Alternatively, if the threshold for autonomy in weapon 
systems is set too low, states will be extremely unlikely to ratify the 
treaty, as they will be unwilling to give up what they perceive as 
necessary technology. 
Finally, regardless of how autonomous weapon systems are 
defined, a ban might exclude certain types or uses no one seems to find 
objectionable, like autonomous weapon systems now employed for 
purely defensive purposes or “smart” weapons which better distinguish 
between lawful and unlawful targets.232 While such exclusions will likely 
increase ratification rates, they would also undermine many ban 
advocates’ goals, such as limiting military investment in weapon 
autonomy and preventing the proliferation of autonomous weapon 
systems. 
 
 226 Heyns Report, supra note 5. 
 227 Chairperson Simon-Michel Report, supra note 6. 
 228 Tim Starks, Killer Robots, Outer Space and Defense Spending Bill in Week Ahead, ROLL 
CALL (July 14, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/five-by-five/killer-robots-outer-space-
and-defense-spending-bill-in-week-ahead/?dcz=. 
 229 See, e.g., ARTICLE 36, KEY AREAS FOR DEBATE ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
(2014); ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88; LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 2; MARSH, supra 
note 50; Mines Action Can. Memorandum, supra note 187.  
 230 See supra Part I.B.4. 
 231 MARSH, supra note 50, at 3. 
 232 See Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 41; Scharre, supra note 73. 
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* * * 
 
Developments in weapons technology often challenge basic 
precepts of the existing law governing armed conflicts. The crossbow 
changed the common understanding of who could be a valuable solider; 
submarines, airplanes, and cyberattacks expanded the scope of potential 
battlefields; nuclear weapons raised the possibility of total war and even 
human-caused human extinction. Autonomous weapon systems 
similarly raise important questions as to the necessary level of human 
involvement in decisions to use lethal force, leading many to call for 
their complete prohibition. 
But autonomous weapon systems share few qualities with weapons 
successfully banned in the past. They are not inherently indiscriminate, 
and they can be designed such that they do not cause superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering. Moreover, as evidenced by autonomous 
weapon systems in use today, they can be used lawfully, effectively, and 
carry out tasks that could not be otherwise achieved. As a result, states 
are unlikely to conclude—let alone comply with—a treaty banning their 
use, unless the ban is so narrowly tailored that it effectively defines 
autonomous weapon systems out of existence. 
All in all, this analysis suggests that states and other parties 
interested in the governance of autonomous weapon systems should 
focus not on banning them, but rather on determining how best to 
regulate their use. 
IV.     HOW SHOULD AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS BE REGULATED? 
“Killer robots” are here, and they are here to stay. But that does not 
imply that efforts to galvanize state interest in their governance have 
been wasted—quite the opposite. All interested parties should take 
advantage of the current momentum to focus on how best to regulate 
this new and swiftly-evolving weaponry. Accordingly, after discussing 
the need for intentional international lawmaking and its myriad 
benefits, this Part concludes with concrete suggestions regarding the 
optimal structure and content of regulations for autonomous weapon 
systems. 
A.     Intentional International Regulation Is Needed—Now 
Some ban skeptics suggest that existing international law is 
currently sufficient to regulate autonomous weapon systems, and so 
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states need not take any formal action.233 To a certain degree, this is 
true. If states do nothing, autonomous weapon systems will continue to 
be governed by the law of armed conflict, a patchwork of relevant law 
from other legal regimes, and various types of soft law.234 To the extent 
areas of ambiguity remain, international law will evolve to address 
them.235 
But a laissez-faire approach sacrifices the current opportunity to 
channel state practice and direct the emergence of new, relevant 
international law. In the absence of an international legislative-like body 
that can weigh ethical, policy, and other considerations to create law 
proactively, international law evolves in a reactionary way, based 
retrospectively on state action. Such precedent is based primarily on the 
specific circumstances of the situation and the state interests at that 
point in time—not on long-term implications or considerations of how 
a given action could be construed in the future. Absent some form of 
intentional law-making focused on the question of how autonomous 
weapon systems should be employed, law will be relegated to describing 
how technological innovations are—and thus may be—employed. 
Nor is the law of armed conflict set in stone. It provides general 
guidance on how any weapon may be lawfully used, but aside from 
requiring states to conduct reviews to prevent the deployment of 
unlawful weapons,236 the law of armed conflict imposes few limitations 
on weapons research or proliferation.237 In the absence of intentional 
regulation, the unchecked development of autonomous weapon systems 
may well pose a significant threat to fundamental humanitarian 
principles and protections—and, by extension, to human lives. 
Weapons systems with increasingly autonomous capabilities may allow 
for an increasingly attenuated temporal and geographic link between a 
human being’s decision to deploy a weapon and the use of lethal force, 
which in turn may undermine current conceptions about what 
constitutes compliance with the distinction requirement, the 
 
 233 See, e.g., Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 2, at 233. 
 234 See Anderson & Waxman, supra note 4, at 22; Crootof, supra note 178; Marchant et al., 
supra note 68, at 306–13. 
 235 See, e.g., Anderson & Waxman, supra note 4, at 27. 
 236 See First Additional Protocol, supra note 137, art. 36 (“In the study, development, 
acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party 
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, 
be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High 
Contracting Party.”). 
  Many argue that this responsibility is one of customary law, as it “flows logically from the 
truism that States are prohibited from using illegal weapons, means and methods of warfare or 
from using weapons, means and methods of warfare in an illegal manner.” Int’l Comm. of the Red 
Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to 
Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 931, 933 (2006). 
 237 See ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 4. 
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proportionality requirement, and other relevant law. 
Autonomous weapon systems are multiplying as governments 
invest huge sums in relevant research and development. However, we 
have not yet passed an event horizon such that law is doomed to follow 
technological innovations in weapons autonomy. It is still possible to 
proactively employ legal means to channel how this new technology 
develops and is used, but the window of opportunity is closing. The time 
to act is now. 
B.     Benefits to Intentional International Regulation 
There are a number of benefits to the premeditated regulation of 
autonomous weapon systems, foremost among which is that it will 
channel research and state practice by limiting what lawful options are 
available. Additionally, the very act of setting forth definitions and rules 
regarding development, usage, or transfer improves the likelihood that 
autonomous weapon systems will be used in accordance with the law, 
because states will have a better understanding of what conduct is 
permissible. Clarified rules may also contribute to the stigmatization of 
unapproved designs or applications. Finally, while all states are 
theoretically equals in the international legal order, in reality some are 
more equal than others. In such an environment, clear rules ensure that 
different states’ actions are evaluated under the same standard. 
The negotiation process necessary to creating international 
regulations can also highlight where the existing law is unclear, 
increasing the likelihood that legal lacunae are prospectively 
addressed.238 Even if states are unable to conclusively determine how to 
fill such gaps, identifying them encourages future discussion, which in 
turn furthers the growth of relevant customary norms. Additionally, the 
regulatory instrument itself can be designed to foster a continued 
conversation, by creating an interpretive body or by requiring state 
parties to convene regularly to consider new issues. 
Stepping back, state interest and engagement in negotiating a treaty 
legitimizes the issue as one deserving of international attention.239 As a 
result, entities and individuals who might not have otherwise considered 
potential impacts of autonomous weapon systems will be more likely to 
do so, and states may be more likely to promulgate national rules and 
policies on the subject. 
Ban advocates argue that a complete ban is preferable to a 
regulatory instrument, as it would be clearer and easier to enforce, 
decrease the possibility that autonomous weapon systems will 
 
 238 This process has already begun. See Chairperson Simon-Michel Report, supra note 6. 
 239 Marchant et al., supra note 68, at 314. 
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proliferate and be misused, and would enhance the stigma associated 
with usage by non-state parties.240 These claims are not necessarily true, 
however—as Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman have discussed, 
weapons autonomy will develop incrementally.241 Bans attempt to 
divide white from black; regulation will better address the evolving grey 
zones of weapons autonomy. Additionally, given the low likelihood that 
states will be able to conclude a treaty ban, let alone an effective one, and 
given that a regulatory instrument could provide many of the beneficial 
legal limitations and humanitarian protections associated with a 
complete ban,242 even those who would have preferred a complete ban 
should welcome efforts to create effective regulation. 
C.     Options for Intentional International Regulation 
Ideally, autonomous weapon systems would be governed by a 
comprehensive legal regime, comprised of international, transnational, 
and domestic laws. While this ideal may not ever be fully realized, states 
and other parties interested in the governance of this new weaponry can 
begin working toward it now. Indeed, many relevant entities—states, 
developers, manufacturers, programmers, et cetera—would likely 
welcome a clarified ethical and legal framework. 
Accordingly, this subsection discusses possible structures and 
content of a regulatory treaty, as well as other, informal sources of 
guidance and governance. It concludes that an ideal international legal 
regime would consist of a framework convention and a thorough 
collection of associated additional protocols, supplemented by domestic 
law and other sources of informal governance mechanisms. 
1.     A Regulatory Treaty 
a.     Structural Considerations 
A regulatory treaty on autonomous weapon systems is most likely 
to take one of two forms. It might be negotiated as a sixth additional 
protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), 
joining the ranks of restrictions on the use of non-detectable fragments, 
mines, incendiary weapons, blinding lasers, and explosive remnants. 
Alternatively, states might negotiate an independent treaty, which 
would ideally take the form of an easily adaptable framework 
convention. 
 
 240 See ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 22–23. 
 241 Anderson & Waxman, supra note 4. 
 242 Cf. ADVANCING THE DEBATE, supra note 88, at 3–4. 
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Constructing a regulatory treaty as an additional protocol to the 
CCW is appealing, primarily because there is already a significant 
impetus toward doing so. The first two international meetings of state 
representatives to discuss autonomous weapon system occurred under 
CCW auspices, and such momentum is not to be underestimated. 
That being said, should the CCW process falter or result in 
minimal regulation, state parties interested in constructing a more 
robust legal regime might attempt to negotiate an independent treaty (as 
occurred with landmines and cluster munitions). Furthermore, there is 
some internal inconsistency in drafting regulations for autonomous 
weapon systems as an additional protocol to the CCW: they are hardly 
“conventional” weapons at present, and they are unlikely to be so for 
quite some time. 
An independent treaty might take one of three forms: it might 
attempt comprehensive regulation (like the Chemical Weapons 
Convention—which, in addition to banning the development, 
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of 
certain defined chemical weapons, also outlines enforcement 
mechanisms), provide piecemeal regulations of specific activities (like 
the Nuclear Test Ban or nonproliferation treaties), or serve as a 
framework treaty intended to be augmented by later protocols (like the 
CCW itself). All of these have associated benefits and drawbacks. 
Comprehensive conventions allow states to create an integrated 
and internally reinforcing regulatory regime. However, precisely 
because of its grand substantive scope and varied opportunities for 
disagreement, a comprehensive treaty on autonomous weapon systems 
is unlikely to be concluded and ratified. The Chemical Weapons 
Convention was successful in part because chemical weapons were well 
understood; the possibilities of increasingly autonomous weapon 
systems are as yet unknown. 
Should a comprehensive convention be attempted, drafters will 
likely favor broad, expansive statements over specific rules, both to 
accommodate as-yet unimagined innovations and to encourage higher 
ratification rates. Flexible provisions are certainly to be preferred, as 
specific ones may quickly be rendered obsolete. However, they also are 
more subject to interpretative abuse. Any comprehensive treaty on 
autonomous weapon systems should therefore create or designate an 
authoritative interpretative body with the power to evaluate whether 
new applications accord with the treaty’s overarching object and 
purpose. 
Piecemeal treaties are useful insofar as they allow states to create 
law for specific issues where there is consensus and table the more 
thorny questions that might prevent the widespread ratification of a 
more comprehensive treaty. Additionally, because any given treaty 
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within the regime is focused on a specific issue, it will be able to address 
the subject in greater depth than a more comprehensive treaty—and, in 
the wake of new innovations, it will be more easily amended, as the 
alteration of one treaty will not threaten the regime as a whole. 
What piecemeal treaty regimes gain in particularity and flexibility, 
however, they lose in integration and cohesion. Different treaties in the 
regime will have different objects and aims, which sometimes may 
conflict with each other. Additionally, different treaties will have 
different state parties, so the law for one state will rarely be the law for 
another. 
A framework convention marries many of the benefits of 
comprehensive and piecemeal treaty regimes. The convention itself can 
clarify definitions and guiding principles, while tabling controversial 
issues for a later date. Because ratifying such a convention is non-
threatening, it is likely to enjoy greater ratification rates than a 
comprehensive treaty and thereby encourage increased state 
involvement in the development of additional protocols. Additional 
protocols can address specific issues and may be amended without 
threatening the legal regime as a whole, but because they are concluded 
under the aegis of the guiding principles of the framework convention, 
there is likely to be more of a focus on integration and internal 
coherence than piecemeal treaty regimes. 
Such an approach is not without problems: the framework 
convention itself is likely to have little to no teeth and on controversial 
subjects—it arguably just kicks the can further down the road, as it is 
only effective to the extent that state parties join the later additional 
protocols resolving such issues.243 Ultimately, however, it is the best 
option. 
 
b.     Subject Matter 
Any initial regulatory treaty will need to include a definition of 
“autonomous weapon system” from a law of armed conflict perspective. 
In constructing such a definition, states will need to determine where to 
set the bar for autonomy, what qualifiers are pertinent and which are 
irrelevant, and whether to except certain currently existing but 
uncontroversial weapon systems. States should also take this 
opportunity to affirm the applicability of the existing law of armed 
conflict principles to the development and use of autonomous weapon 
systems.244 
 
 243 Id. 
 244 Anderson, Reisner & Waxman, supra note 57, at 406–07. 
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After a definition is agreed upon, there are myriad other questions 
for states to consider in evaluating what types and usages of 
autonomous weapon systems should be permissible based on policy, 
ethical, and other considerations. For example, the concept of 
“meaningful human control” has recently emerged as a potential 
guiding principle for the development and use of autonomous weapon 
systems—states might clarify what such control would entail,245 even if 
that standard is difficult to enforce.246 
A regulatory treaty or additional protocol might focus on the 
design or manufacture of autonomous weapon systems, requiring them 
to incorporate components that decrease the possibility of violations of 
the law of armed conflict. One possibility would treat ongoing consent 
as a form of fuel: an autonomous weapon system could be designed to 
check in with a human operator at regular intervals after deployment 
and to shut down or self-destruct if it did not receive reiterated approval 
to continue. Designs that would result in autonomous weapon systems 
with an inappropriate amount of destructive power could also be 
forbidden.  
Additionally or alternatively, a regulatory treaty or additional 
protocol might discuss how autonomous weapon systems may be 
lawfully employed. They might be required to be stationary systems, to 
increase the likelihood that they will only be used for defensive 
purposes. Their potential targets might be restricted to non-human 
entities, or they might be required to be used only for non-lethal 
purposes—perhaps for surveillance, reconnaissance, or search-and-
rescue missions. Their use might be permitted in certain regions, such 
as outer space and the deep sea, or prohibited in others, such as urban 
or densely populated areas. 
A treaty or additional protocol focused on accountability for law of 
armed conflict violations would have additional requirements. At the 
very least, it should reiterate that states are responsible for the actions of 
their autonomous weapon systems. It might also compel states to adopt 
certain policies and practices regarding the training of human operators 
or the human supervision of autonomous weapon systems. It could also 
 
 245 See Michael C. Horowitz & Paul Scharre, Meaningful Human Control in Weapon Systems: 
A Primer (Mar. 2015) (working paper), available at http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/
publications-pdf/Ethical_Autonomy_Working_Paper_031315.pdf (suggesting that “meaningful 
human control” has three necessary components: (1) human operators make informed decisions; 
(2) human operators have sufficient information to ensure the lawfulness of their action; and (3) 
the weapon has been designed and tested and the human operator has been trained to ensure 
effective control over the use of the weapon); Sarah Knuckey, Governments Conclude First (Ever) 
Debate on Autonomous Weapons: What Happened and What’s Next, JUST SECURITY (May 16, 
2014, 12:31 PM), http://justsecurity.org/10518/autonomous-weapons-intergovernmental-meeting 
(discussing state support for “meaningful human control” over autonomous weapon systems). 
 246 See Anderson, Reisner & Waxman, supra note 57, at 397–98; Knuckey, supra note 245. 
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mandate that states implement domestic criminal legislation or military 
procedures to establish individual liability for war crimes committed by 
autonomous weapon systems.247 As noted above, however, autonomous 
weapon systems pose unusual enforcement problems, in that it may be 
impossible for observers to identify when such weaponry is used 
inappropriately. Furthermore, there may be attribution issues: should an 
autonomous weapon system be discovered, independently wreaking 
havoc, it may be impossible to determine what state is responsible for 
deploying it. Any enforcement regime would need to tackle these 
problems. 
While an initial framework treaty will be unlikely to address all 
relevant issues, a comprehensive treaty regime would ideally eventually 
develop and provide guidance regarding the research and development, 
testing, production, sale and transfer, acquisition, and use of 
autonomous weapon systems. 
2.     Informal Lawmaking 
Treaties are often the go-to option for proposals for new law, as 
their ability to create binding international legal obligations is 
uncontested. But there simply may not be sufficient state commitment 
or consensus to conclude a regulatory treaty now. There are also some 
persuasive reasons to avoid codifying concrete regulations at present: 
autonomous weapon systems currently in use are not overly 
controversial, and we do not yet have a full understanding of the 
possibilities and risks posed by weapons systems with greater levels of 
autonomy.248 
But this does not mean we should do nothing. The international 
legal system has myriad alternative sources of guidance and governance, 
many of which can be extremely effective in channeling state action, 
notwithstanding their lack of formal international legal status. These 
sources include common understandings based on international and 
transnational dialogue, nonbinding resolutions and declarations, 
professional guidelines and codes of conduct, civil society reports and 
policy briefs, industry practice, and even domestic laws and policies.249 
Such sources are likely to be both more narrowly tailored and more 
 
 247 See also John Frank Weaver, Asimov’s Three Laws Are Not an International Treaty, SLATE 
(Dec. 1, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/12/
autonomous_weapons_and_international_law_we_need_these_three_treaties_to.html 
(proposing multiple new conventions). 
 248 See Marchant et al., supra note 68, at 283–84 (discussing the impossibility of anticipating 
risks inherent in complex new technologies). 
 249 See Crootof, supra note 178, at 24. 
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flexible than treaty provisions, and thus better able to address 
unanticipated technological breakthroughs.250 
Two prominent examples of influential, nonformal sources of 
guidance are the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare,251 which was commissioned by the NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross’s interpretive guidance regarding the legal status of 
civilians directly participating in hostilities.252 Each of these publications 
was spurred by the fact that new technology—cyberwarfare and drones, 
respectively—raised new questions that were not conclusively addressed 
by the existing law of war. In each case, experts discussed and debated 
how the law should evolve both to satisfy state needs and to preserve 
basic humanitarian protections. Finally, by suggesting rules for 
permissible state action, they sparked wider, ongoing discussions as 
their reasoning and conclusions were evaluated by states, civil society, 
and scholars. States or other interested entities might similarly convene 
a group of experts to issue a comprehensive publication on the law of 
autonomous weapon systems. 
Some of these sources of guidance, like industry practice and 
professional guidelines, will likely develop absent state action. To ensure 
that they do not evolve to undermine fundamental protections of the 
law of armed conflict, states should provide guidance to developers, 
manufacturers, and future operators as to what types and usages of 
autonomous weapon systems are permissible.253 Nor should this be a 
top-down exchange: because these groups will likely have the best 
understanding of actual technical and operational concerns associated 
with autonomous weapon systems, they should be included in any 
attempt to create a comprehensive publication.254 
 
* * * 
 
While law is often fated to trail unanticipated technological 
innovations, that need not be the case with autonomous weapon 
systems. Now is the time for states and other interested parties to take 
proactive measures toward the development of an intentional regulatory 
 
 250 See Marchant et al., supra note 68, at 306–13. 
 251 INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, NATO COOP. CYBER DEFENCE CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN 
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 
2013). 
 252 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Nils Melzer ed., 
2009), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. 
 253 See Anderson, Reisner & Waxman, supra note 57, at 408–09. 
 254 See id. 
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regime for autonomous weapon systems—one which both permits 
states to explore options for effective weapons and also protects the 
fundamental humanitarian principles of the existing law of armed 
conflict. 
CONCLUSION 
“There are no right answers to the wrong questions.”255 
 
The space between proponents and skeptics of a ban on 
autonomous weapon systems is smaller than it may initially appear: all 
parties are interested in preserving the law of armed conflict’s 
humanitarian protections. But those most concerned about the threats 
potentially posed by this new form of weaponry have tended to focus on 
how to ban it, resulting in a spirited debate of the wrong question. 
Claims that autonomous weapon systems could never comply with the 
law of armed conflict and inappropriate comparisons to successful 
weapon bans have succeeded only in further muddying the 
conversation. Meanwhile, states continue to develop and deploy 
autonomous weapon systems in the absence of international 
conversation—much less consensus—on how such weaponry should be 
used. 
In proposing a clarified definition for autonomous weapon 
systems, this Article has attempted to reframe the legal conversation. 
The right question going forward is not how to ban autonomous 
weapon systems, but rather how best to regulate them. We should not 
squander this opportunity to proactively channel the development of 
autonomous weapon systems in futile debates over whether to ban a 
class of uniquely effective weaponry already in widespread use. 
  
 
 255 URSULA K. LE GUIN, PLANET OF EXILE 1 (1966). 
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APPENDIX: HISTORIC BANS 
Independent books could be (and have been) written on the history 
and circumstances unique to attempted and enacted weapon bans. This 
appendix aims to provide some background on oft-cited bans in the 
autonomous weapon systems debate and the common wisdom 
regarding their successes and failures. 
A.     Failed Bans 
Various new technologies have utterly revolutionized warfare, 
often with catastrophic effects for both combatants and civilians. 
Despite sometimes strong and ongoing interest from states and civil 
society, however, attempts to ban certain new weapons have been 
largely unsuccessful. 
1.     Crossbows 
Although not a treaty, one of the earliest weapon bans was Pope 
Urban II’s proclamation prohibiting the use of crossbows in 1096—at 
least, in inter-Christian wars.256 At the time, crossbows were seen as 
destabilizing new weaponry that undermined traditional assumptions of 
how warfare was conducted. For the first time in history, a peasant foot 
soldier with little training could easily kill a high-born, professional 
knight257—an “unequivocal violation of the chivalric code.”258 However, 
due largely to the crossbow’s usefulness, this ban barely outlasted its 
proclamation.259 
2.     Aerial Bombardment 
In 1783 the Montgolfier brothers took the first hot air balloon 
flight; nearly a century later, a balloon was first used in an armed 
 
 256 The Crossbow—A Medieval Doomsday Device?, MIL. HIST. NOW (May 23, 2012), 
militaryhistorynow.com/2012/05/23/the-crossbow-a-medieval-wmd. Pope Innocent II again 
attempted to ban the crossbow in 1139. Reeves & Johnson, supra note 4, at 27 nn.25–36. 
 257 The Crossbow, supra note 256 (noting that “an army of peasants could be made proficient 
with crossbow in weeks, or even days,” as it did not require the strength or skill necessary to 
operate a bow). 
 258 Reeves & Johnson, supra note 4, at 27. 
 259 W.T. Mallison, Jr., The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 316 (1967); Reeves & 
Johnson, supra note 4, at 27. 
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conflict for military reconnaissance.260 In recognition of the possibility 
of balloon-launched bombs, and their likely inaccurate and thus 
indiscriminate nature, states discussed a potential ban on aerial 
bombardment at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference.261 Ultimately, 
twenty-four states—including powerhouses like Austria-Hungary, 
China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and Spain262—ratified a 
Declaration prohibiting, for five years, “the launching of projectiles and 
explosives from balloons, or by other new methods of a similar 
nature.”263 
The attempt to renew the ban after the Wright Brother’s 1903 
flight, however, was less successful. At the 1907 Hague Peace 
Conference, a Declaration with an identical prohibition was drafted, 
again as a temporary ban intended to last only until the third Peace 
Conference.264 France, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Russia did not ratify the 
new Declaration; Austria-Hungary signed but never ratified; and 
Germany’s ratification was conditional on all other participating parties’ 
ratification.265 Arthur Kuhn, writing in 1910, suggested that the 
Declaration’s relative lack of success was likely the result of states’ 
interest in exploring the military applications of the new technology.266 
Recognizing the lack of specific regulations governing air warfare, 
states appointed a Commission of Jurists to develop rules.267 The 
result—the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare268—prohibited aerial 
bombardment for “the purpose of terrorizing the civil population or 
destroying or damaging private property without military character or 
injuring non-combatants” and clarified that aerial bombardment was 
lawful only if directed at a military objective.269 Although the Rules were 
never ratified, they were recognized as clarifying customary 
international law and regularly cited by the League of Nations.270 
 
 260 Javier Guisándex Gómez, The Law of Air Warfare, 323 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 347, 348 
(1998). 
 261 Id. at 349–50. 
 262 The United States signed, but did not ratify, the 1899 Declaration. 
 263 Declaration (IV, I), to Prohibit, for the Term of Five Years, the Launching of Projectiles and 
Explosives from Balloons, and Other Methods of a Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839, 1 
Bevans 270. 
 264 1907 Declaration, supra note 211. 
 265 See Matthew Lippman, Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: 
Technology and Terror from World War I to Afghanistan, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (2002). 
 266 Arthur K. Kuhn, The Beginnings of an Aërial Law, 4 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 119–20 (1910). 
 267 Gómez, supra note 260, at 352. 
 268 Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, 
Dec. 1922–Feb. 1923 (drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague). 
 269 Id. arts. 22, 24. Other articles protected certain civilian buildings, including religious, 
medical, artistic, scientific, and historic structures. Id. arts. 25–26. 
 270 Lippman, supra note 265, at 11, 12–14. 
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At the beginning of World War II, the parties attempted to avoid 
using aerial bombardment in urban areas.271 This ended with the 
September 1939 German aerial attack on Warsaw; in response, Great 
Britain (and, eventually, the United States) began targeting civilian 
population centers as part of their overall aerial strategic plan.272 The 
result was devastating: relentless and indiscriminate strikes by both sides 
led to unprecedented numbers of civilian deaths273—and, ultimately, to 
the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Today, aerial bombardment is governed by a patchwork of treaties 
relevant to air warfare and by the law of armed conflict generally.274 
3.     Submarines 
Although military submarines were never formally prohibited, 
states concluded agreements which so strictly limited their usage that 
they amounted to bans. However, these proscriptions proved largely 
unenforceable in practice. 
As an island nation and naval power, Great Britain sensed its 
vulnerability to submarine warfare.275 At the Hague Peace Conference of 
1899, with Germany’s support, it tried and failed to outlaw submarines 
as a weapon of war.276 
After Germany used submarines with devastating effect in World 
War I, during the 1923 Washington Conference Great Britain again 
tried, and again failed, to completely ban the use of submarines.277 
However, based on a U.S. proposal, the Conference participants adopted 
a general resolution that prohibited the destruction of a merchant vessel 
“unless its crew and passengers have been placed in safety.”278 This 
customary rule, originally applicable to surface warships, was explicitly 
made applicable to submarines in two later treaties. The 1930 London 
Naval Treaty prohibited submarines from neutralizing potentially 
hostile merchant vessels without having first ensured the safety of their 
 
 271 See id. at 15. 
 272 Id. at 15–16 & n.143. 
 273 Id. at 15–19. 
 274 See, e.g., Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
(Protocol III) art. 2(2), Oct. 10, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-1, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 275 See D.P. O’Connell, International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 19, 45 (1970). 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 49. 
 278 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
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passengers, crew, and ship’s papers,279 prohibitions which were 
reiterated in the 1936 London Protocol.280 
But not only was it impossible for Great Britain to ban submarine 
warfare, the treaties delineating how submarines might be lawfully used 
proved almost immediately unenforceable. Submarines depend on 
stealth: they cannot escort captured vessels to ports to ensure the safety 
of their crew and passengers. Nor, due to space constraints, can they 
take additional individuals on board, much less potentially hostile ones. 
As a result, despite the fact that nearly all major naval powers acceded to 
the Protocol,281 during World War II all states with submarines (save 
Japan) engaged in some form of unrestricted submarine warfare in 
violation of their treaty obligations.282 As one scholar noted, the 
Protocol’s requirement was “an unworkable ideal couched in ambiguous 
terms which did not address the practicalities of submarine warfare.”283 
Although the London Protocol still technically states the treaty law 
relevant to submarines,284 in reality their military usage is governed 
largely by the law of armed conflict generally and customary 
international law specific to submarines.285  
4.     Nuclear Weapons 
On August 6, 1945, the United States detonated a uranium bomb 
over Hiroshima, killing more than 140,000 people within a few 
months.286 On August 9, it detonated a plutonium bomb over Nagasaki, 
resulting in the deaths of approximately 74,000 people by the close of 
that year.287 Five months later, in its first resolution, the U.N. General 
Assembly called for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.288 
Over the next few decades, states and civil society attempted to address 
the nuclear weapon threat through a variety of means. 
 
 279 Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament art. 22, Apr. 22, 1930, 46 Stat. 
2858, 112 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter London Naval Treaty]. 
 280 See Jane Gilliland, Note, Submarines and Targets: Suggestions for New Codified Rules of 
Submarine Warfare, 73 GEO. L.J. 975, 978 (1985). 
 281 Id. at 978. 
 282 Id. at 985. 
 283 Parks, supra note 201, at 120. 
 284 London Naval Treaty, supra note 279, art. 23 (providing that the treaty would expire on 
December 31, 1936, with the exception of Article 22, which would “remain in force without limit 
of time”). 
 285 See, e.g., J. Ashley Roach, Legal Aspects of Modern Submarine Warfare, 6 MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. 367, 367 (2002). 
 286 Nuclear Weapons Timeline, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 
http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/the-nuclear-age (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. 
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In 1994, the General Assembly requested that the International 
Court of Justice issue an advisory opinion in response to the question: 
“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted 
under international law?”289 After extensive arguments and much 
deliberation, a split court concluded that no treaty or customary 
international law prohibited the use of nuclear weapons, but 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to 
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in 
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; 
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the 
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude 
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be 
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which the very survival of a State would be at stake . . . .290 
In other words, the court could not find that nuclear weapons were 
per se unlawful, as a situation could be envisioned in which they could 
be lawfully used. Such use remains regulated by the law of armed 
conflict, however, and there remains “the possibility that such a weapon 
could be unlawful by reference to the humanitarian law, if its use could 
never comply with its requirements.”291 In the absence of an official 
pronouncement of per se illegality, the only hope for a complete ban on 
nuclear weapons is through state action—and states have proven 
unwilling to enact such a ban. 
The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty does not ban nuclear weapons 
outright, but rather aims to limit their proliferation and eventually 
achieve universal disarmament.292 The crux of a treaty is an agreement 
between states with and without nuclear weapons: the latter vow not to 
acquire nuclear weapon technology, and the former agree to pursue 
disarmament and to share the benefits of non-military nuclear 
technology. The 190 states party to the Treaty—more than any other 
arms limitation or disarmament agreement—include the five original 
nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
 
 289 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Request for an Advisory Opinion), G.A. 
Res. 49/75(K), U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75, at 6 (Dec. 15, 1994). 
 290 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 167, at 266. However, President Bedjaoui cautioned “that the 
Court’s inability to go beyond this statement of the situation can in no way be interpreted to mean 
that it is leaving the door ajar to recognition of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons.” Id. at 270 (declaration of President Bedjaoui). 
 291 Id. at 589 (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins); see also id. at 320 (dissenting opinion of 
Vice-President Schwebel) (“It cannot be accepted that the use of nuclear weapons on a scale 
which would—or could—result in the deaths of many millions in indiscriminate inferno and by 
far-reaching fallout, have profoundly pernicious effects in space and time, and render 
uninhabitable much or all of the earth, could be lawful.”). 
 292 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 
U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970). 
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the United States).293 However, of the five states not party to the treaty, 
four—India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan—are the only other states 
known or suspected of having nuclear weapons. The Treaty has thus 
been critiqued on the grounds that only slightly over half of the total 
number of states with nuclear weapons are state parties. On the other 
hand, the fact that only nine states currently have nuclear weapons 
might be an indicator of the Treaty’s success. The Treaty has also been 
criticized as benefiting nuclear weapon states at the expense of non-
nuclear states, as the former have yet to eliminate their nuclear 
stockpiles. 
The testing of nuclear weapons is also regulated by two treaties. In 
1963, the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union concluded 
the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which banned nuclear tests in the 
atmosphere, outer space, or underwater.294 Although an important step 
forward, the Treaty did not prohibit underground testing. Additionally, 
neither China nor France became state parties at the time, and North 
Korea never acceded. In 1996, states attempted to close the 
underground loophole by concluding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty, which prohibits nuclear explosions in all environments, for 
military or for civilian purposes.295 There are currently 163 state parties 
to the Treaty.296 However, it cannot enter into force until after all forty-
four listed “nuclear weapon possible” states ratify it; at present, eight 
have not done so.297 China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States 
have signed but not ratified the Treaty; India, North Korea, and 
Pakistan have not signed it.298 Since the Treaty opened for signature, 
India, North Korea, and Pakistan have all tested nuclear weapons.299 
Currently, nuclear weapons are governed by the various specific 
treaties regulating their use and by the law of armed conflict generally.300 
 
 293 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UN OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT 
AFF., http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 294 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1963). 
 295 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-28, 35 
I.L.M. 1439. 
 296 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-4&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2015). 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. 
 299 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Nuclear Tests by India and 
Pakistan, United Nations Press Release SC/6528 (June 6, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/1998/sc6528.doc.htm; Press Statement, Security Council, Security Council Press 
Statement on Nuclear Test Conducted by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, United Nations 
Press Release SC/10912 (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/
sc10912.doc.htm. 
 300 States have also ratified treaties creating wide swaths of “nuclear weapon free zones.” See 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, UN OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., http://www.un.org/
CROOTOF.36.5.5 (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2015  12:28 PM 
1910 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:1837 
 
B.     Un/Successful Bans 
It is easy to determine that an attempted weapon ban has failed: 
either states are unable to conclude a treaty, or no one can credibly 
argue that a purported ban actually keeps states from employing a 
weapon. It is less clear when a ban has been successful. Is success 
measured by the number of state parties? By the number of relevant 
state parties—which is to say, the primary producers and users of a 
weapon or by the major military powers? By state party compliance? By 
the relative level of state party compliance when compared with other 
treaties regarding conduct in warfare?301 By the number of times the 
weapon in question has been used by any state since the ban was 
enacted? Or by whether the use of the weapon has become so 
stigmatized that the ban is recognized as customary international law? 
This subsection discusses commonly cited “successful” bans—
defined here as bans which are both enacted and effective at limiting the 
usage of the banned weapon—organized roughly from the least to most 
obviously effective. Again, a thorough analysis of each ban is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but these brief descriptions do highlight certain 
commonalities. 
1.     Cluster Munitions 
Cluster munitions are weapons that disperse or release 
submunitions or “bomblets.” These submunitions tend to be small, 
unguided explosive devices, designed to detonate just prior to, on, or 
after impact. Submunitions may not deploy when or as intended, 
however, leaving unexploded ordnance that can harm civilians long 
after the armed conflict has concluded. Protocol V to the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons aimed to minimize their impact by, 
among other things, obligating member states to remove or destroy 
unexploded ordnance in their territories when feasible and to take 
“generic preventive measures aimed at minimi[z]ing the occurrence of 
explosive remnants of war.”302 
The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits state parties 
from using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, or 
 
disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ.shtml (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (with links to relevant 
treaties). 
 301 See James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
559, 567 (2007) (finding that bans on chemical and biological weapons enjoyed higher rates of 
compliance than other surveyed treaties regulating the conduct of hostilities). 
 302 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 CCW Convention) arts. 3, 
9, Nov. 28, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-10, 45 I.L.M. 1348. China, Russia, and the United States 
are among the eighty-four state parties. 
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transferring cluster munitions under any circumstances.303 It further 
requires state parties to clear unexploded ordnance and to destroy 
existing stockpiles of such weapons, save only for those to be used for 
research and training related to detection, clearance, and destruction 
techniques.304 The Convention currently has eighty-nine state parties, 
which do not include major military powers (China, Russia, or the 
United States) or many states which have recently used cluster 
munitions (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Israel, Georgia, Libya, Russia, Thailand, 
Syria, and the United States).305 
The success of this ban has yet to be determined. Skeptics of its 
success suggest that it carries little power, as many major cluster 
munition producers, stockpilers, and users have not ratified it.306 
Advocates point to the facts that “[a]t least 33 countries that have 
stockpiled, produced, and/or used cluster munitions have signed” and 
that “[a]lmost half the world, including states from every region, has 
signed the Convention” to argue that there is now “widespread 
international rejection of cluster munitions.”307 
2.     Anti-Personnel Landmines 
Anti-personnel landmines are explosive devices designed to be 
triggered by human beings (and are to be distinguished from landmines 
generally, which include anti-tank or anti-vehicle landmines). Their use 
was first regulated by the since-amended Protocol II to the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons, which prohibits the use of mines 
against the civilian population and set forth various requirements 
 
 303 Convention on Cluster Munitions art. 1, May 30, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357. 
 304 Id. arts. 3–4. 
 305 Compare Convention on Cluster Munitions, UN TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-6&chapter=26&
lang=en (last visited Apr. 27, 2015), with HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TIMELINE OF CLUSTER 
MUNITION USE (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2010.
4.7%20Arms%2C%20Cluster%20Timeline%20of%20FINAL.pdf, and Use of Cluster Bombs: A 
Timeline of Cluster Bomb Use, CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION, 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/cluster-bombs/use-of-cluster-bombs/a-timeline-of-
cluster-bomb-use.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 306 See, e.g., Daniel Joseph Raccuia, Note, The Convention on Cluster Munitions: An Incomplete 
Solution to the Cluster Munition Problem, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 465, 491–92 (2011); Julian 
Ku, Here Comes the Convention on Cluster Munitions, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 17, 2010, 12:09 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/02/17/here-comes-the-convention-on-cluster-munitions. 
 307 See, e.g., HRW TWELVE FACTS, supra note 197, at 1. 
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constraining their use, placement, advertisement, and neutralization.308 
One hundred and two states are party to the Amended Protocol.309 
The adoption of the 1997 Mine Ban Convention, also called the 
Ottawa Treaty, “marked the first time in the history of international 
humanitarian law that States agreed to ban a weapon that was in 
widespread use throughout the world.”310 The Convention prohibits the 
use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and direct or 
indirect transfer of anti-personnel landmines (save for destruction or 
training in detection, clearance, and destruction).311 One hundred and 
sixty-one states are party to the Convention, although these do not 
include China, Russia, or the United States.312 
Since the Convention took effect, there has been a dramatic 
reduction in the production and use of anti-personnel landmines.313 
However, states are still using these landmines, and it is generally agreed 
that the ban has not (yet) evolved into customary international law.314 
3.     Biological Weapons 
Biological weapons include both harmful biological agents and the 
means of their delivery.315 Although its primary aim was forbidding the 
use of poisonous gases in warfare, the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol also 
 
 308 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices (Protocol II), Oct. 10, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-1, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133 (amended May 
3, 1996). 
 309 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
as amended on 3 May 1996, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-2-b&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 310 Anti-Personnel Mines: Overview of the Problem, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Nov. 2, 
2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/mines-fac-cartagena-021109.htm. 
 311 Mine Ban Convention, supra note 210, arts. 1, 3. 
 312 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-5&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2014). 
  The United States has not joined the Ottawa Treaty, originally in part because it and South 
Korea have planted banned mines in the Korean demilitarized zone. See David Glazier, Missing in 
Action? United States Leadership in the Law of War, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1340–41 (2009). 
However, the United States has recently reconsidered its stance on the treaty. See Fact Sheet, supra 
note 203. 
 313 See Ved P. Nanda, The Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations in Strengthening 
and Shaping International Human Rights Law: The Successful Drives to Ban Landmines and to 
Create an International Criminal Court, 19 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 256, 270 
(2011). 
 314 See, e.g., Chapter 29. Landmines, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter29 (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (noting customary 
regulation of landmine use, placement, and neutralization). 
 315 See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 209, art. I. 
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“extend[ed] this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of 
warfare.”316 
This initial ban was strengthened by the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention, the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the 
creation of an entire class of weaponry.317 The Convention does not 
explicitly ban the use of biological weapons—only their development, 
production, and stockpiling. A prohibition on their use is an obviously 
implicit goal, however, and the Convention does note that it is not 
intended to limit states’ obligations under the Geneva Gas Protocol, 
which does explicitly prohibit the use of biological agents in warfare.318 
There are 171 state parties to the Convention; an additional nine have 
signed but not yet acceded, and sixteen states are not members.319 
The success of the Biological Weapons Convention is debatable. 
While it certainly serves as an example of states’ ability to conclude a 
ban regarding an entire class of weaponry, states’ failure to explicitly ban 
the use of biological weapons and the lack of enforcement mechanisms 
seem to render it toothless. 
Nonetheless, the ICRC has concluded that the prohibition on the 
use of biological weapons in international and non-international armed 
conflicts is customary international law.320 This is a credible conclusion, 
given the infrequency of violations, that “[v]irtually all allegations of 
possession by States have been denied,” and the near-universal 
condemnation of Iraq (then not a member state to the Convention) 
when it was discovered in the mid-1990s that it was pursuing biological 
weapons research.321 
4.     Chemical Weapons 
Chemical weapons include both toxic chemicals and the munitions 
or devices designed to disperse them. Notwithstanding initial 
prohibitions against poisons and asphyxiating gases resulting from the 
 
 316 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter 
Geneva Gas Protocol]. 
 317 See Robert D. Pinson, Is Nanotechnology Prohibited by the Biological and Chemical 
Weapons Convention?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 279, 292 (2004). 
 318 Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 209, art. VIII. 
 319 Membership of the Biological Weapons Convention, UN OFF. GENEVA http://www.unog.ch/
80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/7BE6CBBEA0477B52C12571860035FD5C?Open
Document (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 320 Rule 73. Biological Weapons, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule73 (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 321 Id. 
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1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences,322 in World War I both sides 
used chemical weapons extensively.323 
Largely in reaction to the horrors of the gas offensive, states 
concluded the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. It states that “the use in war 
of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion 
of the civilized world,” and that the state parties therefore accept the 
prohibition on their use—at least against other member states.324 There 
are currently 138 state parties to the Protocol.325 And, in World War II, 
neither side made significant use of chemical weapons.326 
In response to various incidents of chemical weapon usage during 
the mid-twentieth century, states concluded the comprehensive 1992 
Chemical Weapons Convention. It prohibits the development, 
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of 
chemical weapons.327 Among other enforcement mechanisms, it 
requires state parties to submit to inspections upon the challenge of any 
other state party.328 One hundred and ninety states are currently party to 
the Convention.329 
Based on treaty law and state practice, the ICRC has determined 
that the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in international or 
non-international armed conflicts is now customary international 
law.330 This conclusion is further bolstered by the Rome Statute’s 
prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in international armed 
conflicts,331 the limited number of Convention violations, and states’ 
 
 322 See Jill M. Sheldon, Note, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does Customary 
International Law Prohibit the Use of Nuclear Weapons in All Circumstances?, 20 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 181, 215–17 (1996). 
 323 See PRICE, supra note 202, at 44. 
 324 Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 316. 
 325 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, UN OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/1925 (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 326 See PRICE, supra note 202, at 4. 
 327 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 205, art. I. 
 328 Id. art. IX(8). This has sparked a vigorous debate as to how to implement this requirement 
without violating the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Edward A. Tanzman, Constitutionality of 
Warrantless On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the United States, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 21 (1988); 
David G. Gray, Note, “Then the Dogs Died”: The Fourth Amendment and Verification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 567 (1994). 
 329 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-3&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2015). Israel and Myanmar have signed but not yet ratified the Convention; Angola, 
Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan have neither signed nor ratified. Id. 
 330 Rule 74. Chemical Weapons, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter24_rule74 (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 331 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xviii), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (banning the use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices”). 
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overwhelmingly negative reaction to Syria’s 2013 use of chemical 
weapons (prior to its September 2013 accession to the Convention). 
5.     Permanently Blinding Lasers 
The 1995 Protocol IV to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons prohibits state parties from employing or transferring “laser 
weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of 
their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced 
vision.”332 There are currently 104 state parties to the Protocol,333 and 
the ICRC has found that its prohibition has attained the status of 
customary international law in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts.334 
The permanently blinding laser ban has two notable characteristics. 
First, it is one of the few prospective bans: although in development at 
the time of the Protocol’s conclusion, blinding lasers had not yet been 
deployed.335 Second, it may be the most successful ban of all time. Not 
only is there little controversy over what weapons it forbids and 
permits,336 there are no recorded violations. 
 
 332 Protocol IV, supra note 207, art. 1. 
 333 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol IV, entitled Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons), UN TREATY 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-2-
a&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 334 Rule 86. Blinding Laser Weapons, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule86 (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 335 Another, less frequently mentioned prospective ban was the 1899 prohibition on the use of 
projectiles intended to diffuse asphyxiating gases. See PRICE, supra note 202, at 15–16. 
 336 This is in stark contrast to other, “successful” bans, such as the prohibition on the use of 
expanding bullets. Although this ban is technically adhered to by all states, there is significant 
controversy regarding what modern weapons it encompasses. See Robin Coupland & Dominique 
Love, The 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets: A Treaty Effective for More than 
100 Years Faces Complex Contemporary Issues, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 135, 136 (2003). 
